The numerous reports in support of action-value representation in the striatum are based on statistical analyses that are subject to two critical confounds and, thus, this long-held belief of striatal action-value representation should be retested using different experiments and analyses.

Action-value signals previously found in many brain areas can be accounted for neither by concurrent serial correlations in neural activity and action value nor by signals for other decision variables.

Whenever monkeys are required to choose between multiple options, neural responses indicate that they first select the desired outcome and then use this information to guide their actions.

Transient suppression of activity in the macaque mediodorsal thalamus impairs adjustment of secondary reinforcer values and disrupts appropriate action selection in a reinforcer devaluation task; this profile is distinct from that of amygdala or subregions of orbitofrontal cortex.

Orbital frontal cortex projection neuron activity is necessary to update state-dependent value change to control model-based behavior.

The dorsal part of the primate caudate head signals integrated multi-dimensional incentive factors essential for computing the motivation for action.

Adaptive decision-making critically depends on antiparallel flows conveying distinct information within thalamocortical circuits, highlighting directionality of functional exchanges as a neural principle potentially at play in virtually any brain circuit with reciprocal projections.

The direct and indirect pathways of the dorsal striatum play indispensable roles in value-dependent action selection and value learning, respectively.

In economic choices under variable action costs, in contrast to the orbitofrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex represents not pre-decision but post-decision variables, thus might inform subsequent actions based on reward and effort associated with the choice outcomes.

Decoding of neural outcome and response representations allows dissecting goal-directed and habitual contributions to behaviour and reveals how acute stress biases the instrumental control of behaviour.