Author response:

We thank the reviewers for their thorough reading and thoughtful feedback. Below, we provisionally address each of the concerns raised in the public reviews, and outline our planned revision that aims to further clarify and strengthen the manuscript.

In our response, we clarify our conceptualization of elasticity as a dimension of controllability, formalizing it within an information-theoretic framework, and demonstrating that controllability and its elasticity are partially dissociable. Furthermore, we provide clarifications and additional modeling results showing that our experimental design and modeling approach are well-suited to dissociating elasticity inference from more general learning processes, and are not inherently biased to find overestimates of elasticity. Finally, we clarify the advantages and disadvantages of our canonical correlation analysis (CCA) approach for identifying latent relationships between multidimensional data sets, and provide additional analyses that strengthen the link between elasticity estimation biases and a specific psychopathology profile.

Reviewer 1:

This research takes a novel theoretical and methodological approach to understanding how people estimate the level of control they have over their environment, and how they adjust their actions accordingly. The task is innovative and both it and the findings are well-described (with excellent visuals). They also offer thorough validation for the particular model they develop. The research has the potential to theoretically inform the understanding of control across domains, which is a topic of great importance.

We thank the reviewer for their favorable appraisal and valuable suggestions, which have helped clarify and strengthen the study’s conclusion.

An overarching concern is that this paper is framed as addressing resource investments across domains that include time, money, and effort, and the introductory examples focus heavily on effort-based resources (e.g., exercising, studying, practicing). The experiments, though, focus entirely on the equivalent of monetary resources - participants make discrete actions based on the number of points they want to use on a given turn. While the same ideas might generalize to decisions about other kinds of resources (e.g., if participants were having to invest the effort to reach a goal), this seems like the kind of speculation that would be better reserved for the Discussion section rather than using effort investment as a means of introducing a new concept (elasticity of control) that the paper will go on to test.

We thank the reviewer for pointing out a lack of clarity regarding the kinds of resources tested in the present experiment. Investing additional resources in the form of extra tickets did not only require participants to pay more money. It also required them to invest additional time – since each additional ticket meant making another attempt to board the vehicle, extending the duration of the trial, and attentional effort – since every attempt required precisely timing a spacebar press as the vehicle crossed the screen. Given this involvement of money, time, and effort resources, we believe it would be imprecise to present the study as concerning monetary resources in particular. That said, we agree with the Reviewer that results might differ depending on the resource type that the experiment or the participant considers most. Thus, in our revision of the manuscript, we will make sure to clarify the kinds of resources the experiment involved, and highlight the open question of whether inferences concerning the elasticity of control generalize across different resource domains.

Setting aside the framing of the core concepts, my understanding of the task is that it effectively captures people's estimates of the likelihood of achieving their goal (Pr(success)) conditional on a given investment of resources. The ground truth across the different environments varies such that this function is sometimes flat (low controllability), sometimes increases linearly (elastic controllability), and sometimes increases as a step function (inelastic controllability). If this is accurate, then it raises two questions.

First, on the modeling front, I wonder if a suitable alternative to the current model would be to assume that the participants are simply considering different continuous functions like these and, within a Bayesian framework, evaluating the probabilistic evidence for each function based on each trial's outcome. This would give participants an estimate of the marginal increase in Pr(success) for each ticket, and they could then weigh the expected value of that ticket choice (Pr(success)*150 points) against the marginal increase in point cost for each ticket. This should yield similar predictions for optimal performance (e.g., opt-out for lower controllability environments, i.e., flatter functions), and the continuous nature of this form of function approximation also has the benefit of enabling tests of generalization to predict changes in behavior if there was, for instance, changes in available tickets for purchase (e.g., up to 4 or 5) or changes in ticket prices. Such a model would of course also maintain a critical role for priors based on one's experience within the task as well as over longer timescales, and could be meaningfully interpreted as such (e.g., priors related to the likelihood of success/failure and whether one's actions influence these). It could also potentially reduce the complexity of the model by replacing controllability-specific parameters with multiple candidate functions (presumably learned through past experience, and/or tuned by experience in this task environment), each of which is being updated simultaneously.

Second, if the reframing above is apt (regardless of the best model for implementing it), it seems like the taxonomy being offered by the authors risks a form of "jangle fallacy," in particular by positing distinct constructs (controllability and elasticity) for processes that ultimately comprise aspects of the same process (estimation of the relationship between investment and outcome likelihood). Which of these two frames is used doesn't bear on the rigor of the approach or the strength of the findings, but it does bear on how readers will digest and draw inferences from this work. It is ultimately up to the authors which of these they choose to favor, but I think the paper would benefit from some discussion of a common-process alternative, at least to prevent too strong of inferences about separate processes/modes that may not exist. I personally think the approach and findings in this paper would also be easier to digest under a common-construct approach rather than forcing new terminology but, again, I defer to the authors on this.

We thank the reviewer for suggesting this interesting alternative modeling approach. We agree that a Bayesian framework evaluating different continuous functions could offer advantages, particularly in its ability to generalize to other ticket quantities and prices. We will attempt to implement this as an alternative model and compare it with the current model.

We also acknowledge the importance of avoiding a potential "jangle fallacy". We entirely agree with the Reviewer that elasticity and controllability inferences are not distinct processes. Specifically, we view resource elasticity as a dimension of controllability, hence the name of our ‘elastic controllability’ model. In response to this and other Reviewers’ comments, we now offer a formal definition of elasticity as the reduction in uncertainty about controllability due to knowing the amount of resources the agent is able and willing to invest (see further details in response to Reviewer 3 below).

With respect to how this conceptualization is expressed in the modelling, we note that the representation in our model of maximum controllability and its elasticity via different variables is analogous to how a distribution may be represented by separate mean and variance parameters. Ultimately, even in the model suggested by the Reviewer, there would need to be a dedicated variable representing elasticity, such as the probability of sloped controllability functions. A single-process account thus allows that different aspects of this process would be differently biased (e.g., one can have an accurate estimate of the mean of a distribution but overestimate its variance). Therefore, our characterization of distinct elasticity and controllability biases (or to put it more accurately, ‘elasticity of controllability bias’ and ‘maximum controllability bias’) is consistent with a common construct account.

That said, given the Reviewer’s comments, we believe that some of the terminology we used may have been misleading. In our planned revision, we will modify the text to clarify that we view elasticity as a dimension of controllability that can only be estimated in conjunction with controllability.

Reviewer 2:

This research investigates how people might value different factors that contribute to controllability in a creative and thorough way. The authors use computational modeling to try to dissociate "elasticity" from "overall controllability," and find some differential associations with psychopathology. This was a convincing justification for using modeling above and beyond behavioral output and yielded interesting results. Interestingly, the authors conclude that these findings suggest that biased elasticity could distort agency beliefs via maladaptive resource allocation. Overall, this paper reveals some important findings about how people consider components of controllability.

We appreciate the Reviewer's positive assessment of our findings and computational approach to dissociating elasticity and overall controllability.

The primary weakness of this research is that it is not entirely clear what is meant by "elastic" and "inelastic" and how these constructs differ from existing considerations of various factors/calculations that contribute to perceptions of and decisions about controllability. I think this weakness is primarily an issue of framing, where it's not clear whether elasticity is, in fact, theoretically dissociable from controllability. Instead, it seems that the elements that make up "elasticity" are simply some of the many calculations that contribute to controllability. In other words, an "elastic" environment is inherently more controllable than an "inelastic" one, since both environments might have the same level of predictability, but in an "elastic" environment, one can also partake in additional actions to have additional control overachieving the goal (i.e., expend effort, money, time).

We thank the reviewer for highlighting the lack of clarity in our concept of elasticity. We first clarify that elasticity cannot be entirely dissociated from controllability because it is a dimension of controllability. If no controllability is afforded, then there cannot be elasticity or inelasticity. This is why in describing the experimental environments, we only label high-controllability, but not low-controllability, environments as ‘elastic’ or ‘inelastic’. For further details on this conceptualization of elasticity, and a planned revision of the text, see our response above to Reviewer 1.

Second, we now clarify that controllability can also be computed without knowing the amount of resources the agent is able and willing to invest, for instance by assuming infinite resources available or a particular distribution of resource availabilities. However, knowing the agent’s available resources often reduces uncertainty concerning controllability. This reduction in uncertainty is what we define as elasticity. Since any action requires some resources, this means that no controllable environment is entirely inelastic if we also consider agents that do not have enough resources to commit any action. However, even in this case environments can differ in the degree to which they are elastic. For further details on this formal definition, see our response to Reviewer 3 below. We will make these necessary clarifications in the revised manuscript.

Importantly, whether an environment is more or less elastic does not determine whether it is more or less controllable. In particular, environments can be more controllable yet less elastic. This is true even if we allow that investing different levels of resources (i.e., purchasing 0, 1, 2, or 3 tickets) constitute different actions, in conjunction with participants’ vehicle choices. Below, we show this using two existing definitions of controllability.

Definition 1, reward-based controllability¹: If control is defined as the fraction of available reward that is controllably achievable, and we assume all participants are in principle willing and able to invest 3 tickets, controllability can be computed in the present task as:

where P(S' = goal ∣ 𝑆, 𝐴, 𝐶 ) is the probability of reaching the treasure from present state 𝑆 when taking action A and investing C resources in executing the action. In any of the task environments, the probability of reaching the goal is maximized by purchasing 3 tickets (𝐶 = 3) and choosing the vehicle that leads to the goal (𝐴 = correct vehicle). Conversely, the probability of reaching the goal is minimized by purchasing 3 tickets (𝐶 = 3) and choosing the vehicle that does not lead to the goal (𝐴 = wrong vehicle). This calculation is thus entirely independent of elasticity, since it only considers what would be achieved by maximal resource investment, whereas elasticity consists of the reduction in controllability that would arise if the maximal available 𝐶 is reduced. Consequently, any environment where the maximum available control is higher yet varies less with resource investment would be more controllable and less elastic.

Note that if we also account for ticket costs in calculating reward, this will only reduce the fraction of achievable reward and thus the calculated control in elastic environments.

Definition 2, information-theoretic controllability²: Here controllability is defined as the reduction in outcome entropy due to knowing which action is taken:

I(S'; A, C | S) = H(S'|S) - H(S'|S, A, C)

where H(S'|S) is the conditional entropy of the distribution of outcomes S' given the present state 𝑆, and H(S'|S, A, C) is the conditional entropy of the outcome given the present state, action, and resource investment.

To compare controllability, we consider two environments with the same maximum control:

• Inelastic environment: If the correct vehicle is chosen, there is a 100% chance of reaching the goal state with 1, 2, or 3 tickets. Thus, out of 7 possible action-resource investment combinations, three deterministically lead to the goal state (≥1 tickets and correct vehicle choice), three never lead to it (≥1 tickets and wrong vehicle choice), and one (0 tickets) leads to it 20% of the time (since walking leads to the treasure on 20% of trials).

• Elastic Environment: If the correct vehicle is chosen, the probability of boarding it is 0% with 1 ticket, 50% with 2 tickets, and 100% with 3 tickets. Thus, out of 7 possible actionresource investment combinations, one deterministically leads to the goal state (3 tickets and correct vehicle choice), one never leads to it (3 tickets and wrong vehicle choice), one leads to it 60% of the time (2 tickets and correct vehicle choice: 50% boarding + 50% × 20% when failing to board), one leads to it 10% of time (2 ticket and wrong vehicle choice), and three lead to it 20% of time (0-1 tickets).

Here we assume a uniform prior over actions, which renders the information-theoretic definition of controllability equal to another definition termed ‘instrumental divergence’3,4. We note that changing the uniform prior assumption would change the results for the two environments, but that would not change the general conclusion that there can be environments that are more controllable yet less elastic.

Step 1: Calculating H(S'|S)

For the inelastic environment:

P(goal) = (3 × 100% + 3 × 0% + 1 × 20%)/7 = .46, P(non-goal) = .54 H(S'|S) = – [.46 × log₂(.46) + .54 × log₂(.54)] = 1 bit

For the elastic environment:

P(goal) = (1 × 100% + 1 × 0% + 1 × 60% + 1 × 10% + 3 × 20%)/7 = .33, P(non-goal) = .67 H(S'|S) = – [.33 × log₂(.33) + .67 × log₂(.67)] = .91 bits

Step 2: Calculating H(S'|S, A, C)

Inelastic environment: Six action-resource investment combinations have deterministic outcomes entailing zero entropy, whereas investing 0 tickets has a probabilistic outcome (20%). The entropy for 0 tickets is: H(S'|C = 0) = -[.2 × log₂(.2) + 0.8 × log₂ (.8)] = .72 bits. Since this actionresource investment combination is chosen with probability 1/7, the total conditional entropy is approximately .10 bits

Elastic environment: 2 actions have deterministic outcomes (3 tickets with correct/wrong vehicle), whereas the other 5 actions have probabilistic outcomes:

2 tickets and correct vehicle (60% success):

H(S'|A = correct, C = 2) = – [.6 × log₂(.6) + .4 × log₂(.4)] = .97 bits 2 tickets and wrong vehicle (10% success):

H(S'|A = wrong, C = 2) = – [.1 × ₂(.1) + .9 × ₂(.9)] = .47 bits 0-1 tickets (20% success):

H(S'|C = 0-1) = – [.2 × ₂(.2) + .8 × ₂ .8)] = .72 bits

Thus the total conditional entropy of the elastic environment is: H(S'|S, A, C) = (1/7) × .97 + (1/7) × .47 + (3/7) × .72 = .52 bits

Step 3: Calculating I(S' | A, S)

Inelastic environment: I(S'; A, C | S) = H(S'|S) – H(S'|S, A, C) = 1 – 0.1 = .9 bits

Elastic environment: I(S'; A, C | S) = H(S'|S) – H(S'|S, A, C) = .91 – .52 = .39 bits

Thus, the inelastic environment offers higher information-theoretic controllability (.9 bits) compared to the elastic environment (.39 bits).

Of note, even if each combination of cost and goal reaching is defined as a distinct outcome, then information-theoretic controllability is higher for the inelastic (2.81 bits) than for the elastic (2.30 bits) environment.

In sum, for both definitions of controllability, we see that environments can be more elastic yet less controllable. We will amend the manuscript to clarify this distinction between controllability and its elasticity.

Reviewer 3:

A bias in how people infer the amount of control they have over their environment is widely believed to be a key component of several mental illnesses including depression, anxiety, and addiction. Accordingly, this bias has been a major focus in computational models of those disorders. However, all of these models treat control as a unidimensional property, roughly, how strongly outcomes depend on action. This paper proposes---correctly, I think---that the intuitive notion of "control" captures multiple dimensions in the relationship between action and outcome is multi-dimensional. In particular, the authors propose that the degree to which outcome depends on how much *effort* we exert, calling this dimension the "elasticity of control". They additionally propose that this dimension (rather than the more holistic notion of controllability) may be specifically impaired in certain types of psychopathology. This idea thus has the potential to change how we think about mental disorders in a substantial way, and could even help us better understand how healthy people navigate challenging decision-making problems.

Unfortunately, my view is that neither the theoretical nor empirical aspects of the paper really deliver on that promise. In particular, most (perhaps all) of the interesting claims in the paper have weak empirical support.

We appreciate the Reviewer's thoughtful engagement with our research and recognition of the potential significance of distinguishing between different dimensions of control in understanding psychopathology. We believe that all the Reviewer’s comments can be addressed with clarifications or additional analyses, as detailed below.

Starting with theory, the elasticity idea does not truly "extend" the standard control model in the way the authors suggest. The reason is that effort is simply one dimension of action. Thus, the proposed model ultimately grounds out in how strongly our outcomes depend on our actions (as in the standard model). Contrary to the authors' claims, the elasticity of control is still a fixed property of the environment. Consistent with this, the computational model proposed here is a learning model of this fixed environmental property. The idea is still valuable, however, because it identifies a key dimension of action (namely, effort) that is particularly relevant to the notion of perceived control. Expressing the elasticity idea in this way might support a more general theoretical formulation of the idea that could be applied in other contexts. See Huys & Dayan (2009), Zorowitz, Momennejad, & Daw (2018), and Gagne & Dayan (2022) for examples of generalizable formulations of perceived control.

We thank the Reviewer for the suggestion that we formalize our concept of elasticity to resource investment, which we agree is a dimension of action. We first note that we have not argued against the claim that elasticity is a fixed property of the environment. We surmise the Reviewer might have misread our statement that “controllability is not a fixed property of the environment”. The latter statement is motivated by the observation that controllability is often higher for agents that can invest more resources (e.g., a richer person can buy more things). We will clarify this in our revision of the manuscript.

To formalize elasticity, we build on Huys & Dayan’s definition of controllability(1) as the fraction of reward that is controllably achievable, 𝜒 (though using information-theoretic definitions(2,3) would work as well). To the extent that this fraction depends on the amount of resources the agent is able and willing to invest (max 𝐶), this formulation can be probabilistically computed without information about the particular agent involved, specifically, by assuming a certain distribution of agents with different amounts of available resources. This would result in a probability distribution over 𝜒. Elasticity can thus be defined as the amount of information obtained about controllability due to knowing the amount of resources available to the agent: I(𝜒; max 𝐶). We will add this formal definition to the manuscript.

Turning to experiment, the authors make two key claims: (1) people infer the elasticity of control, and (2) individual differences in how people make this inference are importantly related to psychopathology. Starting with claim 1, there are three sub-claims here; implicitly, the authors make all three. (1A) People's behavior is sensitive to differences in elasticity, (1B) people actually represent/track something like elasticity, and (1C) people do so naturally as they go about their daily lives. The results clearly support 1A. However, 1B and 1C are not supported. Starting with 1B, the experiment cannot support the claim that people represent or track elasticity because the effort is the only dimension over which participants can engage in any meaningful decision-making (the other dimension, selecting which destination to visit, simply amounts to selecting the location where you were just told the treasure lies). Thus, any adaptive behavior will necessarily come out in a sensitivity to how outcomes depend on effort. More concretely, any model that captures the fact that you are more likely to succeed in two attempts than one will produce the observed behavior. The null models do not make this basic assumption and thus do not provide a useful comparison.

We appreciate the reviewer's critical analysis of our claims regarding elasticity inference, which as detailed below, has led to an important new analysis that strengthens the study’s conclusions. However, we respectfully disagree with two of the Reviewer’s arguments. First, resource investment was not the only meaningful decision dimension in our task, since participant also needed to choose the correct vehicle to get to the right destination. That this was not trivial is evidenced by our exclusion of over 8% of participants who made incorrect vehicle choices more than 10% of the time. Included participants also occasionally erred in this choice (mean error rate = 3%, range [0-10%]).

Second, the experimental task cannot be solved well by a model that simply tracks how outcomes depend on effort because 20% of the time participants reached the treasure despite failing to board their vehicle of choice. In such cases, reward outcomes and control were decoupled. Participants could identify when this was the case by observing the starting location, which was revealed together with the outcome (since depending on the starting location, the treasure location was automatically reached by walking). To determine whether participants distinguished between control-related and non-control-related reward, we have now fitted a variant of our model to the data that allows learning from each of these kinds of outcomes by means of a different free parameter. The results show that participants learned considerably more from control-related outcomes. They were thus not merely tracking outcomes, but specifically inferred when outcomes can be attributed to control. We will include this new analysis in the revised manuscript.

Controllability inference by itself, however, still does not suffice to explain the observed behavior. This is shown by our ‘controllability’ model, which learns to invest more resources to improve control, yet still fails to capture key features of participants’ behavior, as detailed in the manuscript. This means that explaining participants’ behavior requires a model that not only infers controllability—beyond merely outcome probability—but also assumes a priori that increased effort could enhance control. Building these a priori assumption into the model amounts to embedding within it an understanding of elasticity – the idea that control over the environment may be increased by greater resource investment.

That being said, we acknowledge the value in considering alternative computational formulations of adaptation to elasticity. Thus, in our revision of the manuscript, we will add a discussion concerning possible alternative models.

For 1C, the claim that people infer elasticity outside of the experimental task cannot be supported because the authors explicitly tell people about the two notions of control as part of the training phase: "To reinforce participants' understanding of how elasticity and controllability were manifested in each planet, [participants] were informed of the planet type they had visited after every 15 trips." (line 384).

We thank the reviewer for highlighting this point. We agree that our experimental design does not test whether people infer elasticity spontaneously. Our research question was whether people can distinguish between elastic and inelastic controllability. The results strongly support that they can, and this does have potential implications for behavior outside of the experimental task. Specifically, to the extent that people are aware that in some contexts additional resource investment improve control, whereas in other contexts it does not, then our results indicate that they would be able to distinguish between these two kinds of contexts through trial-and-error learning. That said, we agree that investigating whether and how people spontaneously infer elasticity is an interesting direction for future work. We will clarify the scope of the present conclusions in the revised manuscript.

Finally, I turn to claim 2, that individual differences in how people infer elasticity are importantly related to psychopathology. There is much to say about the decision to treat psychopathology as a unidimensional construct. However, I will keep it concrete and simply note that CCA (by design) obscures the relationship between any two variables. Thus, as suggestive as Figure 6B is, we cannot conclude that there is a strong relationship between Sense of Agency and the elasticity bias---this result is consistent with any possible relationship (even a negative one). The fact that the direct relationship between these two variables is not shown or reported leads me to infer that they do not have a significant or strong relationship in the data.

We agree that CCA is not designed to reveal the relationship between any two variables. However, the advantage of this analysis is that it pulls together information from multiple variables. Doing so does not treat psychopathology as unidimensional. Rather, it seeks a particular dimension that most strongly correlates with different aspects of task performance. This is especially useful for multidimensional psychopathology data because such data are often dominated by strong correlations between dimensions, whereas the research seeks to explain the distinctions between the dimensions. Similar considerations hold for the multidimensional task parameters, which although less correlated, may still jointly predict the relevant psychopathological profile better than each parameter does in isolation. Thus, the CCA enabled us to identify a general relationship between task performance and psychopathology that accounts for different symptom measures and aspects of controllability inference.

Using CCA can thus reveal relationships that do not readily show up in two-variable analyses. Indeed, the direct correlation between Sense of Agency (SOA) and elasticity bias was not significant – a result that, for completeness, we will now report in the supplementary materials along with all other direct correlations. We note, however, that the CCA analysis was preregistered and its results were replicated. Furthermore, an auxiliary analysis specifically confirmed the contributions of both elasticity bias (Figure 6D, bottom plot) and, although not reported in the original paper, of the Sense of Agency score (SOA; p=.03 permutation test) to the observed canonical correlation. Participants scoring higher on the psychopathology profile also overinvested resources in inelastic environments but did not futilely invest in uncontrollable environments (Figure 6A), providing external validation to the conclusion that the CCA captured meaningful variance specific to elasticity inference. The results thus enable us to safely conclude that differences in elasticity inferences are significantly associated with a profile of controlrelated psychopathology to which SOA contributed significantly.

Finally, whereas interpretation of individual CCA loadings that were not specifically tested remains speculative, we note that the pattern of loadings largely replicated across the initial and replication studies (see Figure 6B), and aligns with prior findings. For instance, the positive loadings of SOA and OCD match prior suggestions that a lower sense of control leads to greater compensatory effort(7), whereas the negative loading for depression scores matches prior work showing reduced resource investment in depression(5-6).

We will revise the text to better clarify the advantageous and disadvantageous of our analytical approach, and the conclusions that can and cannot be drawn from it.

There is also a feature of the task that limits our ability to draw strong conclusions about individual differences in elasticity inference. As the authors clearly acknowledge, the task was designed "to be especially sensitive to overestimation of elasticity" (line 287). A straightforward consequence of this is that the resulting *empirical* estimate of estimation bias (i.e., the gamma_elasticity parameter) is itself biased. This immediately undermines any claim that references the directionality of the elasticity bias (e.g. in the abstract). Concretely, an undirected deficit such as slower learning of elasticity would appear as a directed overestimation bias. When we further consider that elasticity inference is the only meaningful learning/decisionmaking problem in the task (argued above), the situation becomes much worse. Many general deficits in learning or decision-making would be captured by the elasticity bias parameter. Thus, a conservative interpretation of the results is simply that psychopathology is associated with impaired learning and decision-making.

We apologize for our imprecise statement that the task was ‘especially sensitive to overestimation of elasticity’, which justifiably led to Reviewer’s concern that slower elasticity learning can be mistaken for elasticity bias. To make sure this was not the case, we made use of the fact that our computational model explicitly separates bias direction (λ) from the rate of learning through two distinct parameters, which initialize the prior concentration and mean of the model’s initial beliefs concerning elasticity (see Methods pg. 22). The higher the concentration of the initial beliefs (𝜖), the slower the learning. Parameter recovery tests confirmed that our task enables acceptable recovery of both the bias λ_elasticity (r=.81) and the concentration 𝝐_elasticity (r=.59) parameters. And importantly, the level of confusion between the parameters was low (confusion of 0.15 for 𝝐_elasticity→ λ_elasticity and 0.04 for λ_elasticity→ 𝝐_elasticity). This result confirms that our task enables dissociating elasticity biases from the rate of elasticity learning.

Moreover, to validate that the minimal level of confusion existing between bias and the rate of learning did not drive our psychopathology results, we re-ran the CCA while separating concentration from bias parameters. The results (Author response image 1) demonstrate that differences in learning rate (𝜖) had virtually no contribution to our CCA results, whereas the contribution of the pure bias (𝜆) was preserved.

We will incorporate these clarifications and additional analysis in our revised manuscript.

Author response image 1.

Showing that a model parameter correlates with the data it was fit to does not provide any new information, and cannot support claims like "a prior assumption that control is likely available was reflected in a futile investment of resources in uncontrollable environments." To make that claim, one must collect independent measures of the assumption and the investment.

We apologize if this and related statements seemed to be describing independent findings. They were merely meant to describe the relationship between model parameters and modelindependent measures of task performance. It is inaccurate, though, to say that they provide no new information, since results could have been otherwise. For instance, instead of a higher controllability bias primarily associating with futile investment of resources in uncontrollable environments, it could have been primarily associated with more proper investment of resources in high-controllability environments. Additionally, we believe these analyses are of value to readers who seek to understand the role of different parameters in the model. In our planned revision, we will clarify that the relevant analyses are merely descriptive.

Did participants always make two attempts when purchasing tickets? This seems to violate the intuitive model, in which you would sometimes succeed on the first jump. If so, why was this choice made? Relatedly, it is not clear to me after a close reading how the outcome of each trial was actually determined.

We thank the reviewer for highlighting the need to clarify these aspects of the task in the revised manuscript.

When participants purchased two extra tickets, they attempted both jumps, and were never informed about whether either of them succeeded. Instead, after choosing a vehicle and attempting both jumps, participants were notified where they arrived at. This outcome was determined based on the cumulative probability of either of the two jumps succeeding. Success meant that participants arrived at where their chosen vehicle goes, whereas failure meant they walked to the nearest location (as determined by where they started from).

Though it is unintuitive to attempt a second jump before seeing whether the first succeed, this design choice ensured two key objectives. First, that participants would consistently need to invest not only more money but also more effort and time in planets with high elastic controllability. Second, that the task could potentially generalize to the many real-world situations where the amount of invested effort has to be determined prior to seeing any outcome, for instance, preparing for an exam or a job interview.

It should be noted that the model is heuristically defined and does not reflect Bayesian updating. In particular, it overestimates control by not using losses with less than 3 tickets (intuitively, the inference here depends on your beliefs about elasticity). I wonder if the forced three-ticket trials in the task might be historically related to this modeling choice.

We apologize for not making this clear, but in fact losing with less than 3 tickets does reduce the model’s estimate of available control. It does so by increasing the elasticity estimates

(a_elastic≥1, a_elastic2 parameters), signifying that more tickets are needed to obtain the maximum available level of control, thereby reducing the average controllability estimate across ticket investment options.

It would be interesting to further develop the model such that losing with less than 3 tickets would also impact inferences concerning the maximum available control, depending on present beliefs concerning elasticity, but the forced three-ticket purchases already expose participants to the maximum available control, and thus, the present data may not be best suited to test such a model. These trials were implemented to minimize individual differences concerning inferences of maximum available control, thereby focusing differences on elasticity inferences. We will discuss the Reviewer’s suggestion for a potentially more accurate model in the revised manuscript.

References

(1) Huys, Q. J. M., & Dayan, P. (2009). A Bayesian formulation of behavioral control. Cognition, 113(3), 314– 328.

(2) Ligneul, R. (2021). Prediction or causation? Towards a redefinition of task controllability. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 25(6), 431–433.

(3) Mistry, P., & Liljeholm, M. (2016). Instrumental divergence and the value of control. Scientific Reports, 6, 36295.

(4) Lin, J. (1991). Divergence measures based on the Shannon entropy. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 37(1), 145–151

(5) Cohen RM, Weingartner H, Smallberg SA, Pickar D, Murphy DL. Effort and cognition in depression. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1982 May;39(5):593-7. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1982.04290050061012. PMID: 7092490.

(6) Bi R, Dong W, Zheng Z, Li S, Zhang D. Altered motivation of effortful decision-making for self and others in subthreshold depression. Depress Anxiety. 2022 Aug;39(8-9):633-645. doi: 10.1002/da.23267. Epub 2022 Jun 3. PMID: 35657301; PMCID: PMC9543190.

(7) Tapal, A., Oren, E., Dar, R., & Eitam, B. (2017). The Sense of Agency Scale: A measure of consciously perceived control over one's mind, body, and the immediate environment. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1552

Figures and data

Examples of inelastic vs elastic control:

Experimental design:

Participants adapted to the elasticity of control:

Computational models:

Model simulations:

Individual biases in controllability and elasticity inference:

Model validation.

Parameter Recovery.

Shared variance between elastic controllability* model parameters.