The general version of Hamilton’s rule

Reviewer #1 (Public review):

Summary:

There has been intense controversy over the generality of Hamilton's inclusive fitness rule for how evolution works on social behaviors. All generally agree that relatedness can be a game changer, for example allowing for otherwise unselectable altruistic behaviors when c < rb, where c is the fitness cost to the altruism, b is the fitness benefit to another, and r their relatedness. Many complications have been successfully incorporated into the theory, including different reproductive values and viscous population structures.

The controversy has centered on another dimension; Hamilton's original model was for additive fitness, but how does his result hold when fitnesses are non-additive? One approach has been not to worry about a general result but just find results for particular cases. A consistent finding is that the results depend on the frequency of the social allele - non-additivity causes frequency dependence that was absent in Hamilton's approach. Two other approaches derive from Queller via the Price equation. Queller 1 is to find forms like Hamilton's rule, but with additional terms that deal with non-additive interaction, each with an r-like population structure variable multiplied by a b-like fitness effect (Queller 1985). Queller 2 redefines the fitness effects c and b as partial regressions of the actor's and recipient's genes on fitness. This leaves Hamilton's rule intact, just with new definitions of c and b that depend on frequency.

Queller 2 is the version that has been most adopted by the inclusive fitness community along with assertions that Hamilton's rule in completely general. In this paper, van Veelen argues that Queller 1 is the correct approach. He derives a general form that Queller only hinted at. He does so within a more rigorous framework that puts both Price's equation and Hamilton's rule on firmer statistical ground. Within that framework, the Queller 2 approach is seen to be a statistical misspecification - it employs a model without interaction in cases that actually do have interaction. If we accept that this is a fatal flaw, the original version of Hamilton's rule is limited to linear fitness models, which might not be common.

Strengths:

While the approach is not entirely new, this paper provides a more rigorous approach and a more general result. It shows that both Queller 1 and Queller 2 are identities and give accurate results, because both are derived from the Price equation, which is an identity. So why prefer Queller 1? It identifies the misspecification issue with the Queller 2 approach and points out its consequences. For example, it will not give the minimum squared differences between the model and data. It does not separate the behavioral effects of the individuals from the population state (b and c become dependent on r and the population frequency).

The paper also shows how the same problems can apply to non-social traits. Epistasis is the non-additivity of effects of two genes within the individual. (So one wonders why have we not had a similarly fierce controversy over how we should treat epistasis?)

The paper is clearly written. Though somewhat repetitive, particularly in the long supplement, most of that repetition has the purpose of underscoring how the same points apply equally to a variety of different models.
Finally, this may be a big step towards reconciliation in the inclusive fitness wars. Van Veelen has been one of the harshest critics of inclusive fitness, and now he is proposing a version of it.

Weaknesses:

van Veelen argues that the field essentially abandoned the Queller 1 approach after its publication. I think this is putting it too strongly - there have been a number of theoretical studies that incorporate extra terms with higher-order relatednesses. It is probably accurate to say that there has been relative neglect. But perhaps this is partly due to a perception that this approach is difficult to apply.

The model in this paper is quite elegant and helps clarify conceptual issues, but I wonder how practical it will turn out to be. In terms of modeling complicated cases, I suspect most practitioners will continue doing what they have been doing, for example using population genetics or adaptive dynamics, without worrying about neatly separating out a series of terms multiplying fitness coefficients and population structure coefficients.

For empirical studies, it is going to be hard to even try to estimate all those additional parameters. In reality, even the standard Hamilton's rule is rarely tested by trying to estimate all its parameters. Instead, it is commonly tested more indirectly, for example by comparative tests of the importance of relatedness. That of course would not distinguish between additive and non-additive models that both depend on relatedness, but it does test the core idea of kin selection. It will be interesting to see if van Veelen's approach stimulates new ways of exploring the real world.

Reviewer #2 (Public review):

Summary:

This manuscript reconsiders the "general form" of Hamilton's rule, in which "benefit" and "cost" are defined as regression coefficients. It points out that there is no reason to insist on Hamilton's rule of the form -c+br>0, and that, in fact, arbitrarily many terms (i.e. higher-order regression coefficients) can be added to Hamilton's rule to reflect nonlinear interactions. Furthermore, it argues that insisting on a rule of the form -c+br>0 can result in conditions that are true but meaningless and that statistical considerations should be employed to determine which form of Hamilton's rule is meaningful for a given dataset or model.

Strengths:

The point is an important one. While it is not entirely novel-the idea of adding extra terms to Hamilton's rule has arisen sporadically (Queller 1985, 2011; Fletcher & Zwick 2006; van Veelen et al. 2017)--it is very useful to have a systematic treatment of this point. I think the manuscript can make an important contribution by helping to clarify a number of debates in the literature. I particularly appreciate the heterozygote advantage example in the SI.

Weaknesses:

Although the mathematical analysis is rigorously done and I largely agree with the conclusions, I feel there are some issues regarding terminology, some regarding the state of the field, and the practice of statistics that need to be clarified if the manuscript is truly to resolve the outstanding issues of the field. Otherwise, I worry that it will in some ways add to the confusion.

(1) The "generalized" Price equation: I agree that the equations labeled (PE.C) and (GPE.C) are different in a subtle yet meaningful way. But I do not see any way in which (GPE.C) is more general than (PE.C). That is, I cannot envision any circumstance in which (GPE.C) applies but (PE.C) does not. A term other than "generalized" should be used.

(2) Regression vs covariance forms of the Price equation

I think the author uses "generalized" in reference to what Price called the "regression form" of his equation. But to almost everyone in the field, the "Price Equation" refers to the covariance form. For this reason, it is very confusing when the manuscript refers to the regression form as simply "the Price Equation".

As an example, in the box on p. 15, the manuscript states "The Price equation can be generalized, in the sense that one can write a variety of Price-like equations for a variety of possible true models, that may have generated the data." But it is not the Price equation (covariance form) that is being generalized here. It is only the regression that Price used that is being generalized.

To be consistent with the field, I suggest the term "Price Equation" be used only to refer to the covariance form unless it is otherwise specified as in "regression form of the Price equation".

(3) Sample covariance: The author refers to the covariance in the Price equation as "sample covariance". This is not correct, since sample covariance has a denominator of N-1 rather than N (Bessel's correction). The correct term, when summing over an entire population, is "population covariance". Price (1972) was clear about this: "In this paper we will be concerned with population functions and make no use of sample functions". This point is elaborated on by Frank (2012), in the subsection "Interpretation of Covariance".

Of course, the difference is negligible when the population is large. However, the author applies the covariance formula to populations as small as N=2, for which the correction factor is significant.

The author objects to using the term "population covariance" (SI, pp. 8-9) on the grounds that it might be misleading if the covariance, regression coefficients, etc. are used for inference because in this case, what is being inferred is not a population statistic but an underlying relationship. However, I am not convinced that statistical inference is or should be the primary use of the Price equation (see next point). At any rate, avoiding potential confusion is not a sufficient reason to use incorrect terminology.

Relatedly, I suggest avoiding using E for the second term in the Price equation, since (as the ms points out), it is not the expectation of any random variable. It is a population mean. There is no reason not to use something like Avg or bar notation to indicate population mean. Price (1972) uses "ave" for average.

I should add, however, that the distinction between population statistics vs sample statistics goes away for regression coefficients (e.g. b, c, and r in Hamilton's rule) since in this case, Bessel's correction cancels out.

(4) Descriptive vs. inferential statistics

When discussing the statistical quantities in the Price Equation, the author appears to treat them all as inferential statistics. That is, he takes the position that the population data are all generated by some probabilistic model and that the goal of computing the statistical quantities in the Price Equation is to correctly infer this model.

It is worth pointing out that those who argue in favor of the Price Equation do not see it this way: "it is a mistake to assume that it must be the evolutionary theorist, writing out covariances, who is performing the equivalent of a statistical analysis." (Gardner, West, and Wild, 2011); "Neither data nor inferences are considered here" (Rousset 2015). From what I can tell, to the supporters of the Price equation and the regression form of Hamilton's rule, the statistical quantities involved are either population-level *descriptive* statistics (in an empirical context), or else are statistics of random variables (in a stochastic modeling context).

In short, the manuscript seems to argue that Price equation users are performing statistical inference incorrectly, whereas the users insist that they are not doing statistical inference at all.

The problem (and here I think the author would agree with me) arises when users of the Price equation go on to make predictive or causal claims that would require the kind of statistical analysis they claim not to be doing. Claims of the form "Hamilton's rule predicts.." or use of terms like "benefit" and "cost" suggest that one has inferred a predictive or causal relationship in the given data, while somehow bypassing the entire theory of statistical inference.

There is also a third way to use the Price equation which is entirely unobjectionable: as a way to express the relationship between individual-level fitness and population-level gene frequency change in a form that is convenient for further algebraic manipulation. I suspect that this is actually the most common use of the Price equation in practice.

For a paper that aims to clarify these thorny concepts in the literature, I think it is worth pointing out these different interpretations of statistical quantities in the Price equation (descriptive statistics vs inferential statistics vs algebraic manipulation). One can then critique the conclusions that are inappropriately drawn from the Price equation, which would require rigorous statistical inference to draw. Without these clarifications, supporters of the Price equation will again argue that this manuscript has misunderstood the purpose of the equation and that they never claimed to do inference in the first place.

(5) "True" models

Even if one accepts that the statistical quantities in the Price equation are inferential in nature, the author appears to go a step further by asserting that, even in empirical populations, there is a specific "true" model which it is our goal to infer. This assumption manifests at many points in the SI when the author refers to the "true model" or "true, underlying population structure" in the context of an empirical population.

I do not think it is necessary or appropriate, in empirical contexts, to posit the existence of a Platonic "true" model that is generating the data. Real populations are not governed by mathematical models. Moreover, the goal of statistical inference is not to determine the "true model" for given data but to say whether a given statistical model is justified based on this data. Fitting a linear model, for example, does not rule out the possibility there may be higher-order interactions - it just means we do not have a statistical basis to infer these higher-order interactions from the data (say, because their p-scores are insignificant), and so we leave them out.

What we can say is that if we apply the statistical model to data generated by a probabilistic model, and if these models match, then as the number of observations grows to infinity, the estimators in the statistical model converge to the parameters of the data-generating one. But this is a mathematical statement, not a statement about real-world populations.

A resolution I suggest to points 3, 4, and 5 above is:
*A priori, the statistical quantities in the Price Equation are descriptive statistics, pertaining only to the specific population data given.
*If one wishes to impute any predictive power, generalizability, or causal meaning to these statistics, all the standard considerations of inferential statistics apply. In particular, one must choose a statistical model that is justified based on the given data. In this case, one is not guaranteed to obtain the standard (linear) Hamilton's rule and may obtain any of an infinite family of rules.
*If one uses a model that is not justified based on the given data, the results will still be correct for the given population data but will lack any meaning or generalizability beyond that.
*In particular, if one considers data generated by a probabilistic model, and applies a statistical model that does not match the data-generating one, the results will be misleading, and will not generalize beyond the randomly generated realization one uses.

Of course, the author may propose a different resolution to points 3-5, but they should be resolved somehow. Otherwise, the terminology in the manuscript will be incorrect and the ms will not resolve confusion in the field.

Reviewer #3 (Public review):

There is an interesting mathematical connection - an "isomorphism"-between Price's equation and least-squares linear regression. Some people have misinterpreted this connection as meaning that there is a generality-limiting assumption of linearity within Price's equation, and hence that Hamilton's rule-which is derived from Price's equation-provides only an approximation of the action of natural selection. This is in contrast to the majority view that Hamilton's rule is a fully general and exact result.

To briefly give some mathematical details: Price's equation defines the action of natural selection in relation to a trait of interest as the covariance between fitness w and the genetic breeding value g for the trait, i.e. cov(w,g); this is a fully general result that applies exactly to any arbitrary set of (g,w) data; without any loss of generality this covariance can be expressed as the product of genetic variance var(g) and a coefficient b(w,g), the coefficient simply being defined as b(w,g) = cov(w,g)/var(g) for all var(g) > 0; it happens that if one fits a straight line to the same (g,w) data by means of least-squares regression then the slope of that line is equal to b(w,g).

All of this has already been discussed, repeatedly, in the literature.

Now turn to the present paper: the first sentence of the Abstract says "The generality of Hamilton's rule is much debated", and then the next sentence says "In this paper, I show that this debate can be resolved by constructing a general version of Hamilton's rule". But immediately it's clear that this isn't really resolving the debate, what this paper is actually doing is asserting the correctness of the minority view (i.e. that Hamilton's rule as it currently stands is not a general result) and then attempting to build a more general form of Hamilton's rule upon that shaky foundation. Predictably, the paper erroneously interprets the standard formulation of Hamilton's rule as a linear approximation and develops non-linear extensions to improve the goodness of fit for a result that is already exactly correct.

This is not a convincing contribution. It will not change minds or improve understanding of the topic.

Nor is it particularly novel. Smith et al (2010, "A generalisation of Hamilton's rule for the evolution of microbial cooperation" Science 328, 1700-1703) similarly interpreted Hamilton's rule as a linear model and provided a corresponding polynomial expansion - usefully fitting the model to microbial data so as to learn something about the costs and benefits of cooperation in an empirical setting. it's odd that this paper isn't cited here.