Author response:
The following is the authors’ response to the previous reviews
Reviewer #1 (Public review):
This paper presents a computational model of the evolution of two different kinds of helping ("work," presumably denoting provisioning, and defense tasks) in a model inspired by cooperatively breeding vertebrates. The helpers in this model are a mix of previous offspring of the breeder and floaters that might have joined the group, and can either transition between the tasks as they age or not. The two types of help have differential costs: "work" reduces "dominance value," (DV), a measure of competitiveness for breeding spots, which otherwise goes up linearly with age, but defense reduces survival probability. Both eventually might preclude the helper from becoming a breeder and reproducing. How much the helpers help, and which tasks (and whether they transition or not), as well as their propensity to disperse, are all evolving quantities. The authors consider three main scenarios: one where relatedness emerges from the model, but there is no benefit to living in groups, one where there is no relatedness, but living in larger groups gives a survival benefit (group augmentation, GA), and one where both effects operate. The main claim is that evolving defensive help or division of labor requires the group augmentation; it doesn't evolve through kin selection alone in the authors' simulations.
This is an interesting model, and there is much to like about the complexity that is built in. Individual-based simulations like this can be a valuable tool to explore the complex interaction of life history and social traits. Yet, models like this also have to take care of both being very clear on their construction and exploring how some of the ancillary but potentially consequential assumptions affect the results, including robust exploration of the parameter space. I think the current manuscript falls short in these areas, and therefore, I am not yet convinced of the results. In this round, the authors provided some clarity, but some questions still remain, and I remain unconvinced by a main assumption that was not addressed.
Based on the authors' response, if I understand the life history correctly, dispersers either immediately join another group (with 1-the probability of dispersing), or remain floaters until they successfully compete for a breeder spot or die? Is that correct? I honestly cannot decide because this seems implicit in the first response but the response to my second point raises the possibility of not working while floating but can work if they later join a group as a subordinate. If it is the case that floaters can have multiple opportunities to join groups as subordinates (not as breeders; I assume that this is the case for breeding competition), this should be stated, and more details about how. So there is still some clarification to be done, and more to the point, the clarification that happened only happened in the response. The authors should add these details to the main text. Currently, the main text only says vaguely that joining a group after dispersing " is also controlled by the same genetic dispersal predisposition" without saying how.
In each breeding cycle, individuals have the opportunity to become a breeder, a helper, or a floater. Social role is really just a state, and that state can change in each breeding cycle (see Figure 1). Therefore, floaters may join a group as subordinates at any point in time depending on their dispersal propensity, and subordinates may also disperse from their natal group any given time. In the “Dominance-dependent dispersal propensities” section in the SI, this dispersal or philopatric tendency varies with dominance rank.
We have added: “In each breeding cycle” (L415) to clarify this further.
In response to my query about the reasonableness of the assumption that floaters are in better condition (in the KS treatment) because they don't do any work, the authors have done some additional modeling but I fail to see how that addresses my point. The additional simulations do not touch the feature I was commenting on, and arguably make it stronger (since assuming a positive beta_r -which btw is listed as 0 in Table 1- would make floaters on average be even more stronger than subordinates). It also again confuses me with regard to the previous point, since it implies that now dispersal is also potentially a lifetime event. Is that true?
We are not quite sure where the reviewer gets this idea because we have never assumed a competitive advantage of floaters versus helpers. As stated in the previous revision, floaters can potentially outcompete subordinates of the same age if they attempt to breed without first queuing as a subordinate (step 5 in Figure 1) if subordinates are engaged in work tasks. However, floaters also have higher mortality rates than group members, which makes them have lower age averages. In addition, helpers have the advantage of always competing for an open breeding position in the group, while floaters do not have this preferential access (in Figure S2 we reduce even further the likelihood of a floater to try to compete for a breeding position).
Moreover, in the previous revision (section: “Dominance-dependent dispersal propensities” in the SI) we specifically addressed this concern by adding the possibility that individuals, either floaters or subordinate group members, react to their rank or dominance value to decide whether to disperse (if subordinate) or join a group (if floater). Hence, individuals may choose to disperse when low ranked and then remain on the territory they dispersed to as helpers, OR they may remain as helpers in their natal territory as low ranked individuals and then disperse later when they attain a higher dominance value. The new implementation, therefore, allows individuals to choose when to become floaters or helpers depending on their dominance value. This change to the model affects the relative competitiveness between floaters and helpers, which avoids the assumption that either low- or high-quality individuals are the dispersing phenotype and, instead, allows rank-based dispersal as an emergent trait. As shown in Figure S5, this change had no qualitative impact on the results.
To make this all clearer, we have now added to all of the relevant SI tables a new row with the relative rank of helpers vs floaters. As shown, floaters do not consistently outrank helpers. Rather, which role is most dominant depends on the environment and fitness trade-offs that shape their dispersing and helping decisions.
Some further clarifications: beta_r is a gene that may evolve either positive or negative values, 0 (no reaction norm of dispersal to dominance rank) is the initial value in the simulations before evolution takes place. Therefore, this value may evolve to positive or negative values depending on evolutionary trade-offs. Also, and as clarified in the previous comment, the decision to disperse or not occurs at each breeding cycle, so becoming a floater, for example, is not a lifetime event unless they evolve a fixed strategy (dispersal = 0 or 1).
Meanwhile, the simplest and most convincing robustness check, which I had suggested last round, is not done: simply reduce the increase in the R of the floater by age relative to subordinates. I suspect this will actually change the results. It seems fairly transparent to me that an average floater in the KS scenario will have R about 15-20% higher than the subordinates (given no defense evolves, y_h=0.1 and H_work evolves to be around 5, and the average lifespan for both floaters and subordinates are in the range of 3.7-2.5 roughly, depending on m). That could be a substantial advantage in competition for breeding spots, depending on how that scramble competition actually works. I asked about this function in the last round (how non-linear is it?) but the authors seem to have neglected to answer.
As we mentioned in the previous comment above, we have now added the relative rank between helpers and floaters to all the relevant SI tables, to provide a better idea of the relative competitiveness of residents versus dispersers for each parameter combination. As seen in Table S1, the competitive advantage of floaters is only marginally in the favor for floaters in the “Only kin selection” implementation. This advantage only becomes more pronounced when individuals can choose whether to disperse or remain philopatric depending on their rank. In this case, the difference in rank between helpers and floaters is driven by the high levels of dispersal, with only a few newborns (low rank) remaining briefly in the natal territory (Table S6). Instead, the high dispersal rates observed under the “Only kin selection” scenario appear to result from the low incentives to remain in the group when direct fitness benefits are absent, unless indirect fitness benefits are substantially increased. This effect is reinforced by the need for task partitioning to occur in an all-or-nothing manner (see the new implementation added to the “Kin selection and the evolution of division of labor” in the Supplementary materials; more details in following comments).
In addition, we specifically chose not to impose this constraint of forcing floaters to be lower rank than helpers because doing so would require strong assumptions on how the floaters rank is determined. These assumptions are unlikely to be universally valid across natural populations (and probably not commonly met in most species) and could vary considerably among species. Therefore, it would add complexity to the model while reducing generalizability.
As stated in the previous revision, no scramble competition takes place, this was an implementation not included in the final version of the manuscript in which age did not have an influence in dominance. Results were equivalent and we decided to remove it for simplicity prior to the original submission, as the model is already very complex in the current stage; we simply forgot to remove it from Table 1, something we explained in the previous round of revisions.
More generally, I find that the assumption (and it is an assumption) floaters are better off than subordinates in a territory to be still questionable. There is no attempt to justify this with any data, and any data I can find points the other way (though typically they compare breeders and floaters, e.g.: https://bioone.org/journals/ardeola/volume-63/issue-1/arla.63.1.2016.rp3/The-Unknown-Life-of-Floaters--The-Hidden-Face-of/10.13157/arla.63.1.2016.rp3.full concludes "the current preliminary consensus is that floaters are 'making the best of a bad job'."). I think if the authors really want to assume that floaters have higher dominance than subordinates, they should justify it. This is driving at least one and possibly most of the key results, since it affects the reproductive value of subordinates (and therefore the costs of helping).
We explicitly addressed this in the previous revision in a long response about resource holding potential (RHP). Once again, we do NOT assume that dispersers are at a competitive advantage to anyone else. Floaters lack access to a territory unless they either disperse into an established group or colonize an unoccupied territory. Therefore, floaters endure higher mortalities due to the lack of access to territories and group living benefits in the model, and are not always able to try to compete for a breeding position.
The literature reports mixed evidence regarding the quality of dispersing individuals, with some studies identifying them as low-quality and others as high-quality, attributing this to them experiencing fewer constraints when dispersing that their counterparts (e.g. Stiver et al. 2007 Molecular Ecology; Torrents‐Ticó, et al. 2018 Journal of Zoology). Additionally, dispersal can provide end-of-queue individuals in their natal group an opportunity to join a queue elsewhere that offers better prospects, outcompeting current group members (Nelson‐Flower et al. 2018 Journal of Animal Ecology). Moreover, in our model floaters do not consistently have lower dominance values or ranks than helpers, and dominance value is often only marginally different.
In short, we previously addressed the concern regarding the relative competitiveness of floaters compared to subordinate group members. To further clarify this point here, we have now included additional data on relative rank in all of the relevant SI tables. We hope that these additions will help alleviate any remaining concerns on this matter.
Regarding division of labor, I think I was not clear so will try again. The authors assume that the group reproduction is 1+H_total/(1+H_total), where H_total is the sum of all the defense and work help, but with the proviso that if one of the totals is higher than "H_max", the average of the two totals (plus k_m, but that's set to a low value, so we can ignore it), it is replaced by that. That means, for example, if total "work" help is 10 and "defense" help is 0, total help is given by 5 (well, 5.1 but will ignore k_m). That's what I meant by "marginal benefit of help is only reduced by a half" last round, since in this scenario, adding 1 to work help would make total help go to 5.5 vs. adding 1 to defense help which would make it go to 6. That is a pretty weak form of modeling "both types of tasks are necessary to successfully produce offspring" as the newly added passage says (which I agree with), since if you were getting no defense by a lot of food, adding more food should plausibly have no effect on your production whatsoever (not just half of adding a little defense). This probably explains why often the "division of labor" condition isn't that different than the no DoL condition.
The model incorporates division of labor as the optimal strategy for maximizing breeder productivity, while penalizing helping efforts that are limited to either work or defense alone. Because the model does not intend to force the evolution of help as an obligatory trait (breeders may still reproduce in the absence of help; k0 ≠ 0), we assume that the performance of both types of task by the helpers is a non-obligatory trait that complements parental care.
That said, we recognize the reviewer’s concern that the selective forces modeled for division of labor might not be sufficient in the current simulations. To address this, we have now introduced a new implementation, as discussed in the “Kin selection and the evolution of division of labor” section in the SI. In this implementation, division of labor becomes obligatory for breeders to gain a productivity boost from the help of subordinate group members. The new implementation tests whether division of labor can arise solely from kin selection benefits. Under these premises, philopatry and division of labor do emerge through kin selection, but only when there is a tenfold increase in productivity per unit of help compared to the default implementation. Thus, even if such increases are biologically plausible, they are more likely to reflect the magnitudes characteristic of eusocial insects rather than of cooperatively breeding vertebrates (the primary focus of this model). Such extreme requirements for productivity gains and need for coordination further suggest that group augmentation, and not kin selection, is probably the primary driving force particularly in harsh environments. This is now discussed in L210-213.
Reviewer #2 (Public review):
Summary:
This paper formulates an individual-based model to understand the evolution of division of labor in vertebrates. The model considers a population subdivided in groups, each group has a single asexually-reproducing breeder, other group members (subordinates) can perform two types of tasks called "work" or "defense", individuals have different ages, individuals can disperse between groups, each individual has a dominance rank that increases with age, and upon death of the breeder a new breeder is chosen among group members depending on their dominance. "Workers" pay a reproduction cost by having their dominance decreased, and "defenders" pay a survival cost. Every group member receives a survival benefit with increasing group size. There are 6 genetic traits, each controlled by a single locus, that control propensities to help and disperse, and how task choice and dispersal relate to dominance. To study the effect of group augmentation without kin selection, the authors cross-foster individuals to eliminate relatedness. The paper allows for the evolution of the 6 genetic traits under some different parameter values to study the conditions under which division of labour evolves, defined as the occurrence of different subordinates performing "work" and "defense" tasks. The authors envision the model as one of vertebrate division of labor.
The main conclusion of the paper is that group augmentation is the primary factor causing the evolution of vertebrate division of labor, rather than kin selection. This conclusion is drawn because, for the parameter values considered, when the benefit of group augmentation is set to zero, no division of labor evolves and all subordinates perform "work" tasks but no "defense" tasks.
Strengths:
The model incorporates various biologically realistic details, including the possibility to evolve age polytheism where individuals switch from "work" to "defence" tasks as they age or vice versa, as well as the possibility of comparing the action of group augmentation alone with that of kin selection alone.
Weaknesses:
The model and its analysis is limited, which makes the results insufficient to reach the main conclusion that group augmentation and not kin selection is the primary cause of the evolution of vertebrate division of labor. There are several reasons.
First, the model strongly restricts the possibility that kin selection is relevant. The two tasks considered essentially differ only by whether they are costly for reproduction or survival. "Work" tasks are those costly for reproduction and "defense" tasks are those costly for survival. The two tasks provide the same benefits for reproduction (eqs. 4, 5) and survival (through group augmentation, eq. 3.1). So, whether one, the other, or both tasks evolve presumably only depends on which task is less costly, not really on which benefits it provides. As the two tasks give the same benefits, there is no possibility that the two tasks act synergistically, where performing one task increases a benefit (e.g., increasing someone's survival) that is going to be compounded by someone else performing the other task (e.g., increasing that someone's reproduction). So, there is very little scope for kin selection to cause the evolution of labour in this model. Note synergy between tasks is not something unusual in division of labour models, but is in fact a basic element in them, so excluding it from the start in the model and then making general claims about division of labour is unwarranted. I made this same point in my first review, although phrased differently, but it was left unaddressed.
The scope of this paper was to study division of labor in cooperatively breeding species with fertile workers, in which help is exclusively directed towards breeders to enhance offspring production (i.e., alloparental care), as we stated in the previous review. Therefore, in this context, helpers may only obtain fitness benefits directly or indirectly by increasing the productivity of the breeders. This benefit is maximized when division of labor occurs between group members as there is a higher return for the least amount of effort per capita. Our focus is in line with previous work in most other social animals, including eusocial insects and humans, which emphasizes how division of labor maximizes group productivity. This is not to suggest that the model does not favor synergy, as engaging in two distinct tasks enhances the breeders' productivity more than if group members were to perform only one type of alloparental care task. We have expanded on the need for division of labor by making the performance of each type of task a requirement to boost the breeders productivity, see more details in a following comment.
Second, the parameter space is very little explored. This is generally an issue when trying to make general claims from an individual-based model where only a very narrow parameter region has been explored of a necessarily particular model. However, in this paper, the issue is more evident. As in this model the two tasks ultimately only differ by their costs, the parameter values specifying their costs should be varied to determine their effects. Instead, the model sets a very low survival cost for work (yh=0.1) and a very high survival cost for defense (xh=3), the latter of which can be compensated by the benefit of group augmentation (xn=3). Some very limited variation of xh and xn is explored, always for very high values, effectively making defense unevolvable except if there is group augmentation. Hence, as I stated in my previous review, a more extensive parameter exploration addressing this should be included, but this has not been done. Consequently, the main conclusion that "division of labor" needs group augmentation is essentially enforced by the limited parameter exploration, in addition to the first reason above.
We systematically explored the parameter landscape and report in the body of the paper only those ranges that lead to changes in the reaction norms of interest (other ranges are explored in the SI). When looking into the relative magnitude of cost of work and defense tasks, it is important to note that cost values are not directly comparable because they affect different traits. However, the ranges of values capture changes in the reaction norms that lead to rank-depending task specialization.
To illustrate this more clearly, we have added a new section in the SI (Variation in the cost of work tasks instead of defense tasks section) showing variation in yh, which highlights how individuals trade off the relative costs of different tasks. As shown, the results remain consistent with everything we showed previously: a higher cost of work (high yh) shifts investment toward defense tasks, while a higher cost of defense (high xh) shifts investment toward work tasks.
Importantly, additional parameter values were already included in the SI of the previous revision, specifically to favor the evolution of division of labor under only kin selection. Basically, division of labor under only kin selection does happen, but only under conditions that are very restrictive, as discussed in the “Kin selection and the evolution of division of labor” section in the SI. We have tried to make this point clearer now (see comments to previous reviewer above, and to this reviewer right below).
Third, what is called "division of labor" here is an overinterpretation. When the two tasks evolve, what exists in the model is some individuals that do reproduction-costly tasks (so-called "work") and survival-costly tasks (so-called "defense"). However, there are really no two tasks that are being completed, in the sense that completing both tasks (e.g., work and defense) is not necessary to achieve a goal (e.g., reproduction). In this model there is only one task (reproduction, equation 4,5) to which both "tasks" contribute equally and so one task doesn't need to be completed if the other task compensates for it. So, this model does not actually consider division of labor.
Although it is true that we did not make the evolution of help obligatory and, therefore, did not impose division of labor by definition, the assumptions of the model nonetheless create conditions that favor the emergence of division of labor. This is evident when comparing the equilibria between scenarios where division of labor was favored versus not favored (Figure 2 triangles vs circles).
That said, we acknowledge the reviewer’s concern that the selective forces modeled in our simulations may not, on their own, be sufficient to drive the evolution of division of labor under only kin selection. Therefore, we have now added a section where we restrict the evolution of help to instances in which division of labor is necessary to have an impact on the dominant breeder productivity. Under this scenario, we do find division of labor (as well as philopatry) evolving under only kin selection. However, this behavior only evolves when help highly increases the breeders’ productivity (by a factor of 10 what is needed for the evolution of division of labor under group augmentation). Therefore, group augmentation still appears to be the primary driver of division of labor, while kin selection facilitates it and may, under certain restrictive circumstances, also promote division of labor independently (discussed in L210-213).
Reviewer #1 (Recommendations for the authors):
I really think you should do the simulations where floaters do not come out ahead by floating. That will likely change the result, but if it doesn't, you will have a more robust finding. If it does, then you will have understood the problem better.
As we outlined in the previous round of revisions, implementing this change would be challenging without substantially increasing model complexity and reducing its general applicability, as it would require strong assumptions that could heavily influence dispersal decisions. For instance, by how much should helpers outcompete floaters? Would a floater be less competitive than a helper regardless of age, or only if age is equal? If competitiveness depends on equal age, what is the impact of performing work tasks given that workers always outcompete immigrants? Conversely, if floaters are less competitive regardless of age, is it realistic that a young individual would outcompete all immigrants? If a disperser finds a group immediately after dispersal versus floating for a while, is the dominance value reduced less (as would happen to individuals doing prospections before dispersal)?
Clearly it is not as simple as the referee suggests because there are many scenarios that would need to be considered and many assumptions made in doing this. As we explained to the points above, we think our treatment of floaters is consistent with the definition of floaters in the literature, and our model takes a general approach without making too many assumptions.
Reviewer #2 (Recommendations for the authors):
The paper's presentation is still unclear. A few instances include the following. It is unclear what is plotted in the vertical axes of Figure 2, which is T but T is a function of age t, so this T is presumably being plotted at a specific t but which one it is not said.
The values graphed are the averages of the phenotypically expressed tasks, not the reaction norms per se. We have now rewritten the the axis to “Expressed task allocation T (0 = work, 1 = defense)” to increase clarity across the manuscript.
The section titled "The need for division of labor" in the methods is still very unclear.
We have rephased this whole section to improve clarity.
