The time course of neural activity predictive of self-initiated movement

Reviewer #1 (Public review):

Summary:

Jeay-Bizot and colleagues investigate the neural correlates of the preparation of, and commitment to, a self-initiated motor action. In their introduction, they differentiate between theoretical proposals relating to the timing of such neural correlates relative to the time of a recorded motor action (e.g., a keypress). These are categorised into 'early' and 'late' timing accounts. The authors advocate for 'late' accounts based on several arguments that align well with contemporary models of decision-making in other domains (for example, evidence accumulation models applied to perceptual decisions). They also clearly describe prevalent methodological issues related to the measurement of event-related potentials (ERPs) and time-frequency power to gauge the timing of the commitment to making a motor action. These methodological insights are communicated clearly and denote potentially important limitations on the inferences that can be drawn from a large body of existing work.

To attempt to account for such methodological concerns, the authors devise an innovative experiment that includes an experimental condition whereby participants make a motor action (a right-hand keypress) to make an image disappear. They also include a condition whereby the stimulus presentation program automatically proceeds at a set time that is matched to the response timing in a previous trial. In this latter condition, no motor action is required by the participant. The authors then attempt to determine the times at which they can differentiate between these two conditions (motor action vs no motor action) based on EEG and MEG data, using event-related potential analyses, time-frequency analyses, and multivariate classifiers. They also apply analysis techniques based on comparing M/EEG amplitudes at different time windows (as used in previous work) to compare these results to those of their key analyses.

When using multivariate classifiers to discriminate between conditions, they observed very high classification performance at around -100ms from the time of the motor response or computer-initiated image transition, but lower classification performance and a lack of statistically significant effects across analyses for earlier time points. Based on this, they make the key claim that measured M/EEG responses at the earlier time points (i.e., earlier than around -100ms from the motor action) do not reliably correlate with the execution of a motor action (as opposed to no such action being prepared or made). This is argued to favour 'late' accounts of motor action commitment, aligning with the well-made theoretical arguments in favour of these accounts in the introduction. Although the exact time window related to 'late' accounts is not concretely specified, an effect that occurs around -100ms from response onset is assumed here to fall within that window.

Importantly, this claim relies on accepting the null hypothesis of zero effect for the time points preceding around -100ms based on a somewhat small sample of n=15 and some additional analyses of individual participant datasets. Although the authors argue that their classifiers are sensitive to detecting relevant effects, and the study appears well-powered to detect the (likely to be large magnitude) M/EEG signal differences occurring around the time of the response or computer-initiated image transition, there is no guarantee that the study is adequately sensitive to detect earlier differences in M/EEG signals. These earlier effects are likely to be more subtle and exhibit lower signal-to-noise ratios, but would still be relevant to the 'early' vs 'late' debate framed in the manuscript. This, along with some observed patterns in the data, may substantially reduce the confidence one may have in the key claim about the onset timing of M/EEG signal differences.

Notably, there is some indication of above-chance (above 0.5 AUC) classification performance at time points earlier than -100ms from the response, as visible in Figure 3A for the task-based EEG analyses (EEG OC dataset, blue line). While this was not statistically significantly above chance for their n=15 sample, these results do not appear to be clear evidence in favour of a zero-effect null-hypothesis. In Figures 2A-B, there are also visible differences in the ERPs across conditions, from around the time that motor action-related components have been previously observed (around -500ms from the response). The plotted standard errors in the data are large enough to indicate that the study may not have been adequately powered to differentiate between the conditions.

Although the authors acknowledge this limitation in the discussion section of their manuscript, their counter-argument is that the classifiers could reliably differentiate between conditions at time points very close to the motor response, and in the time-based analyses where substantive confounds are likely to be present, as demonstrated in a set of analyses. Based on this data, the authors imply that the study is sufficiently powered to detect effects across the range of time points used in the analyses. While it's commendable that these extra analyses were run, they do not provide convincing evidence that the study is necessarily sensitive to detecting more subtle effects that may occur at earlier time points. In other words, the ability of classifiers (or other analysis methods) to detect what are likely to be very prominent, large effects around the time of the motor response does not guarantee that such analyses will detect smaller magnitude effects at other time points.

In summary, the authors develop some very important lines of argument for why existing work may have misestimated the timing of neural signals that precede motor actions. This in itself is an important contribution to the field. However, their attempt to better estimate the timing of such signals is limited by a reliance on accepting the null hypothesis based on non-statistically significant results, and arguably a limited degree of sensitivity to detect subtle but meaningful effects.

Strengths:

This manuscript provides compelling reasons why existing studies may have misestimated the timing of the neural correlates of motor action preparation and execution. They provide additional analyses as evidence of the relevant confounds and provide simulations to back up their claims. This will be important to consider for many in the field. They also endeavoured to collect large numbers of trials per participant to also examine effects in individuals, which is commendable and arguably better aligned with contemporary theory (which pertains to how individuals make decisions to act, rather than groups of people).

The innovative control condition in their experiment may also be very useful for providing complementary evidence that can better characterise the neural correlates of motor action preparation and commitment. The method for matching image durations across active and passive conditions is particularly well thought-out and provides a nice control for a range of potential confounding factors.

Weaknesses:

There is a mismatch between the stated theoretical phenomenon of interest (commitment to making a motor action) and what is actually tested in the study (differences in neural responses when an action is prepared and made compared to when no action is required). The assumed link between these concepts could be made more explicit for readers, particularly because it is argued in the manuscript that neural correlates of motor action preparation are not necessarily correlates of motor action commitment.

As mentioned in the summary, the main issue is the strong reliance on accepting the null hypothesis of no differences between motor action and computer initiation conditions based on a lack of statistically significant results from the modest (n=15) sample. Although a larger sample will increase measurement precision at the group level, there are some EEG data processing changes that could increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the analysed data and produce more precise estimates of effects, which may improve the ability to detect more subtle effects, or at least provide more confidence in the claims of null effects.

First, it is stated in the EEG acquisition and preprocessing section that the 64-channel Biosemi EEG data were recorded with a common average reference applied. Unless some non-standard acquisition software was used (of which we are not aware exists), Biosemi systems do not actually apply this reference at recording (it is for display purposes only, but often mistaken to be the actual reference applied). As stated in the Biosemi online documentation, a reference should be subsequently applied offline; otherwise, there is a substantial decrease in the signal-to-noise ratio of the EEG data, and a large portion of ambient alternating current noise is retained in the recordings. This can be easily fixed by applying a referencing scheme (e.g., the common average reference) offline as one of the first steps of data processing. If this was, in fact, done offline, it should be clearly communicated in the manuscript.

In addition, the data is downsampled using a non-integer divisor of the original sampling rate (a 2,048 Hz dataset is downsampled to 500 Hz rather than 512 Hz). Downsampling using a non-integer divisor is not recommended and can lead to substantial artefacts in raw data as a result, as personally observed by this Reviewer in Biosemi data. Finally, although a 30 Hz low-pass filter is applied for visualisation purposes of ERPs, no such filter is applied prior to analyses, and no method is used to account for alternating current noise that is likely to be in the data. As noted above, much of the alternating current noise will be retained when an offline reference is not applied, and this is likely to further degrade the quality of the data and reduce one's ability to identify subtle patterns in EEG signals. Changes in data processing to address these issues would likely lead to more precise estimates of EEG signals (and by extension differences across conditions).

With regard to possible effects extending hundreds of milliseconds before the response, it would be helpful for the authors to more precisely clarify the time windows associated with 'early' and 'late' theories in this case. The EEG data that would be required to support 'early' theories is also not made sufficiently clear. For example, even quite early neural correlates of motor actions in this task (e.g., around -500ms from the response, or earlier) could still be taken as evidence for the 'late' theories if these correlates simply reflect the accumulation of evidence toward making a decision and associated motor action, as implied by the Leaky Stochastic Accumulator model described by the authors. In other words, even observations of neural correlates of motor action preparation that occur much earlier than the response would not constitute clear evidence against the 'late' account if this neural activity represents an antecedent to a decision and action (rather than commitment to the action), as the authors point out in the introduction.

In addition, there is some discrepancy regarding the data that is used by the classifiers to differentiate between the conditions in the EEG data and the claims about the timing of neural responses that differentiate between conditions. Unless we reviewers are mistaken, the Sliding Window section of the methods states that the AUC scores in Figure 3 are based on windows of EEG data that extend from the plotted time point until 0.5 seconds into the past. In other words, an AUC value at -100ms from the response is based on classifiers applied to data ranging from -600 to -100 milliseconds relative to the response. In this case, the range of data used by the classifiers extends much earlier than the time points indicated by Figure 3, and it is difficult to know whether the data at these earlier time points may have contributed (even in subtle ways) to the success of the classifiers. This may undermine the claim that neural responses only become differentiable from around -100ms from response onset. The spans of these windows used for classification could be made more explicit in Figure 3, and classification windows that are narrower could be included in a subset of analyses to ensure that classifiers only using data in a narrow window around the response show the high degree of classification performance in the dataset. If we are mistaken, then perhaps these details could be clarified in the method and results sections.

Reviewer #2 (Public review):

Summary:

The authors set out to investigate how well the onset of a self-initiated movement could be predicted at different times prior to action onset. To do so, they collected EEG and MEG data across 15 human participants who watched natural landscape images on a screen. These participants performed active self-initiated movements or observed passive actions to have a new image appear. By comparing the neural activity prior to active and time-matched passive actions, the authors found that even though a build-up of neural activity is visible close to 1s prior to action, action onset could only be reliably predicted around 100ms prior to action. These results confirm what was already suggested in previous literature: the commitment to action is only clear from the late stages in the visible neural ramp-up to action onset.

Strengths:

(1) The paper presents a well-thought-out methodology to assess the predictive value of neural activity prior to a self-initiated movement and passively observed action, while keeping all other experimental factors identical. This methodology can be applied outside the specific scope of this paper as well, in efforts to assess the correspondence of a neural signature with an observed behavior.

(2) The results are a strong confirmation of what was suggested less clearly in previous research (Trevena & Miller, 2010, Consciousness & Cognition; Schmidt et al., 2016, Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews; Travers et al., 2020, NeuroImage).

Weaknesses:

(1) Although the authors conducted a solid confirmatory study, the importance of this confirmation is less clear to me. How do the current results change our interpretation of the relation between conscious intention and neural preparation for action? Do these results affect our interpretation of free will? Why does it matter at all whether we see neural preparatory activity prior to the report of a conscious intention to act, or prior to action observation? This study does not clarify the relationship between the observed neural phenomenon, the action or the experienced intention. It does not explain whether this relation is causal, correlational or something else.

(2) Whereas Derchi et al. (2023, Scientific Reports) were able to keep the entire experimental context similar across intended and unintended conditions, Jeay-Bizot et al. have one big difference between their passive and active conditions: the presence of a movement. Therefore, the present results explain the presence or absence of a movement rather than the presence or absence of an intention to act.