Causal evidence for a domain-specific role of left superior frontal sulcus in human perceptual decision making

Reviewer #1 (Public Review):

Summary:

In this study, participants completed two different tasks. A perceptual choice task in which they compared the sizes of pairs of items and a value-different task in which they identified the higher value option among pairs of items with the two tasks involving the same stimuli. Based on previous fMRI research, the authors sought to determine whether the superior frontal sulcus (SFS) is involved in both perceptual and value-based decisions or just one or the other. Initial fMRI analyses were devised to isolate brain regions that were activated for both types of choices and also regions that were unique to each. Transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied to the SFS in between fMRI sessions and it was found to lead to a significant decrease in accuracy and RT on the perceptual choice task but only a decrease in RT on the value-different task. Hierarchical drift-diffusion modelling of the data indicated that the TMS had led to a lowering of decision boundaries in the perceptual task and a lower of non-decision times on the value-based task. Additional analyses show that SFS covaries with model-derived estimates of cumulative evidence and that this relationship is weakened by TMS.

Strengths:

The paper has many strengths including the rigorous multi-pronged approach of causal manipulation, fMRI and computational modelling which offers a fresh perspective on the neural drivers of decision making. Some additional strengths include the careful paradigm design which ensured that the two types of tasks were matched for their perceptual content while orthogonalizing trial-to-trial variations in choice difficulty. The paper also lays out a number of specific hypotheses at the outset regarding the behavioural outcomes that are tied to decision model parameters and are well justified.

Weaknesses:

Unless I have missed it, the SFS does not actually appear in the list of brain areas significantly activated by the perceptual and value tasks in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2. Its presence or absence from the list of significant activations is not mentioned by the authors when outlining these results in the main text. What are we to make of the fact that it is not showing significant activation in these initial analyses?

The value difference task also requires identification of the stimuli, and therefore perceptual decision-making. In light of this, the initial fMRI analyses do not seem terribly informative for the present purposes as areas that are activated for both types of tasks could conceivably be specifically supporting perceptual decision-making only. I would have thought brain areas that are playing a particular role in evidence accumulation would be best identified based on whether their BOLD response scaled with evidence strength in each condition which would make it more likely that areas particular to each type of choice can be identified. The rationale for the authors' approach could be better justified.

TMS led to reductions in RT in the value-difference as well as the perceptual choice task. DDM modelling indicated that in the case of the value task, the effect was attributable to reduced non-decision time which the authors attribute to task learning. The reasoning here is a little unclear. If task learning is the cause, then why are similar non-decision time effects not observed in the perceptual choice task? Given that the value-task actually requires perceptual decision-making, is it not possible that SFS disruption impacted the speed with which the items could be identified, hence delaying the onset of the value-comparison choice?

The sample size is relatively small. The authors state that 20 subjects is 'in the acceptable range' but it is not clear what is meant by this.

Reviewer #2 (Public Review):

Summary:

The authors set out to test whether a TMS-induced reduction in excitability of the left Superior Frontal Sulcus influenced evidence integration in perceptual and value-based decisions. They directly compared behaviour - including fits to a computational decision process model - and fMRI pre and post-TMS in one of each type of decision-making task. Their goal was to test domain-specific theories of the prefrontal cortex by examining whether the proposed role of the SFS in evidence integration was selective for perceptual but not value-based evidence.

Strengths:

The paper presents multiple credible sources of evidence for the role of the left SFS in perceptual decision-making, finding similar mechanisms to prior literature and a nuanced discussion of where they diverge from prior findings. The value-based and perceptual decision-making tasks were carefully matched in terms of stimulus display and motor response, making their comparison credible.

Weaknesses:
More information on the task and details of the behavioural modelling would be helpful for interpreting the results. I had the following concerns:

(1) The evidence for a choice and 'accuracy' of that choice in both tasks was determined by a rating task that was done in advance of the main testing blocks (twice for each stimulus). For the perceptual decisions, this involved asking participants to quantify a size metric for the stimuli, but the veracity of these ratings was not reported, nor was the consistency of the value-based ones. It is my understanding that the size ratings were used to define the amount of perceptual evidence in a trial, rather than the true size differences, and without seeing more data the reliability of this approach is unclear. More concerning was the effect of 'evidence level' on behaviour in the value-based task (Figure 3a). While the 'proportion correct' increases monotonically with the evidence level for the perceptual decisions, for the value-based task it increases from the lowest evidence level and then appears to plateau at just above 80%. This difference in behaviour between the two tasks brings into question the validity of the DDM which is used to fit the data, which assumes that the drift rate increases linearly in proportion to the level of evidence.

(2) The paper provides very little information on the model fits (no parameter estimates, goodness of fit values or simulated behavioural predictions). The paper finds that TMS reduced the decision bound for perceptual decisions but only affected non-decision time for value-based decisions. It would aid the interpretation of this finding if the relative reliability of the fits for the two tasks was presented.

(3) Behaviourally, the perceptual task produced decreased response times and accuracy post-TMS, consistent with a reduced bound and consistent with some prior literature. Based on the results of the computational modelling, the authors conclude that RT differences in the value-based task are due to task-related learning, while those in the perceptual task are 'decision relevant'. It is not fully clear why there would be such significantly greater task-related learning in the value-based task relative to the perceptual one. And if such learning is occurring, could it potentially also tend to increase the consistency of choices, thereby counteracting any possible TMS-induced reduction of consistency?

Reviewer #3 (Public Review):

Summary:

Garcia et al., investigated whether the human left superior frontal sulcus (SFS) is involved in integrating evidence for decisions across either perceptual and/or value-based decision-making. Specifically, they had 20 participants perform two decision-making tasks (with matched stimuli and motor responses) in an fMRI scanner both before and after they received continuous theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the left SFS. The stimulation thought to decrease neural activity in the targeted region, led to reduced accuracy on the perceptual decision task only. The pattern of results across both model-free and model-based (Drift diffusion model) behavioural and fMRI analyses suggests that the left SLS plays a critical role in perceptual decisions only, with no equivalent effects found for value-based decisions. The DDM-based analyses revealed that the role of the left SLS in perceptual evidence accumulation is likely to be one of decision boundary setting. Hence the authors conclude that the left SFS plays a domain-specific causal role in the accumulation of evidence for perceptual decisions. These results are likely to add importance to the literature regarding the neural correlates of decision-making.

Strengths:

The use of TMS strengthens the evidence for the left SFS playing a causal role in the evidence accumulation process. By combining TMS with fMRI and advanced computational modelling of behaviour, the authors go beyond previous correlational studies in the field and provide converging behavioural, computational, and neural evidence of the specific role that the left SFS may play.

Sophisticated and rigorous analysis approaches are used throughout.

Weaknesses:

Though the stimuli and motor responses were equalised between the perception and value-based decision tasks, reaction times (according to Figure 1) and potential difficulty (Figure 2) were not matched. Hence, differences in task difficulty might represent an alternative explanation for the effects being specific to the perception task rather than domain-specificity per se.

No within- or between-participants sham/control TMS condition was employed. This would have strengthened the inference that the apparent TMS effects on behavioural and neural measures can truly be attributed to the left SFS stimulation and not to non-specific peripheral stimulation and/or time-on-task effects.

No a priori power analysis is presented.