Distinct neural mechanisms underlying perceptual and attentional impairments of conscious access

  1. Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
  2. Amsterdam Brain and Cognition, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
  3. Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Peer review process

Not revised: This Reviewed Preprint includes the authors’ original preprint (without revision), an eLife assessment, and public reviews.

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Editors

  • Reviewing Editor
    Peter Kok
    University College London, London, United Kingdom
  • Senior Editor
    Tirin Moore
    Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, United States of America

Reviewer #1 (Public Review):

Summary:

In this work, Noorman and colleagues test the predictions of the "four-stage model" of consciousness by combining psychophysics and scalp EEG in humans. The study relies on an elegant experimental design to investigate the respective impact of attentional and perceptual blindness on visual processing.

The study is very well summarised, the text is clear and the methods seem sound. Overall, a very solid piece of work. I haven't identified any major weaknesses. Below I raise a few questions of interpretation that may possibly be the subject of a revision of the text.

(1) The perceptual performance on Fig1D appears to show huge variation across participants, with some participants at chance levels and others with performance > 90% in the attentional blink and/or masked conditions. This seems to reveal that the procedure to match performance across participants was not very successful. Could this impact the results? The authors highlight the fact that they did not resort to post-selection or exclusion of participants, but at the same time do not discuss this equally important point.

(2) In the analysis on collinearity and illusion-specific processing, the authors conclude that the absence of a significant effect of training set demonstrates collinearity-only processing. I don't think that this conclusion is warranted: as the illusory and non-illusory share the same shape, so more elaborate object processing could also be occuring. Please discuss.

(3) Discussion, lines 426-429: It is stated that the results align with the notion that processes of perceptual segmentation and organization represent the mechanism of conscious experience. My interpretation of the results is that they show the contrary: for the same visibility level in the attentional blind or masking conditions, these processes can be implicated or not, which suggests a role during unconscious processing instead.

(4). The two paradigms developed here could be used jointly to highlight non-idiosyncratic NCCs, i.e. EEG markers of visibility or confidence that generalise regardless of the method used. Have the authors attempted to train the classifier on one method and apply it to another (e.g. AB to masking and vice versa)? What perceptual level is assumed to transfer?

(5). How can the results be integrated with the attentional literature showing that attentional filters can be applied early in the processing hierarchy?

Reviewer #2 (Public Review):

Summary:

This is a very elegant and important EEG study that unifies within a single set of behaviorally equated experimental conditions conscious access (and therefore also conscious access failures) during visual masking and attentional blink (AB) paradigms in humans. By a systematic and clever use of multivariate pattern classifiers across conditions, they could dissect, confirm, and extend a key distinction (initially framed within the GNWT framework) between 'subliminal' and 'pre-conscious' unconscious levels of processing. In particular, the authors could provide strong evidence to distinguish here within the same paradigm these two levels of unconscious processing that precede conscious access : (i) an early (< 80ms) bottom-up and local (in brain) stage of perceptual processing ('local contrast processing') that was preserved in both unconscious conditions, (ii) a later stage and more integrated processing (200-250ms) that was impaired by masking but preserved during AB. On the basis of preexisting studies and theoretical arguments, they suggest that this later stage could correspond to lateral and local recurrent feedback processes. Then, the late conscious access stage appeared as a P3b-like event.

Strengths:

The methodology and analyses are strong and valid. This work adds an important piece in the current scientific debate about levels of unconscious processing and specificities of conscious access in relation to feed-forward, lateral, and late brain-scale top-down recurrent processing.

Weaknesses:

- The authors could improve clarity of the rich set of decoding analyses across conditions.
- They could also enrich their Introduction and Discussion sections by taking into account the importance of conscious influences on some unconscious cognitive processes (revision of traditional concept of 'automaticity'), that may introduce some complexity in Results interpretation
- They should discuss the rich literature reporting high-level unconscious processing in masking paradigms (culminating in semantic processing of digits, words or even small group of words, and pictures) in the light of their proposal (deeper unconscious processing during AB than during masking).

Reviewer #3 (Public Review):

Summary:

This work aims to investigate how perceptual and attentional processes affect conscious access in humans. By using multivariate decoding analysis of electroencephalography (EEG) data, the authors explored the neural temporal dynamics of visual processing across different levels of complexity (local contrast, collinearity, and illusory perception). This is achieved by comparing the decidability of an illusory percept in matched conditions of perceptual (i.e., degrading the strength of sensory input using visual masking) and attentional impairment (i.e., impairing top-down attention using attentional blink, AB). The decoding results reveal three distinct temporal responses associated with the three levels of visual processing. Interestingly, the early stage of local contrast processing remains unaffected by both masking and AB. However, the later stage of collinearity and illusory percept processing are impaired by the perceptual manipulation but remain unaffected by the attentional manipulation. These findings contribute to the understanding of the unique neural dynamics of perceptual and attentional functions and how they interact with the different stages of conscious access.

Strengths:

The study investigates perceptual and attentional impairments across multiple levels of visual processing in a single experiment. Local contrast, collinearity, and illusory perception were manipulated using different configurations of the same visual stimuli. This clever design allows for the investigation of different levels of visual processing under similar low-level conditions.

Moreover, behavioural performance was matched between perceptual and attentional manipulations. One of the main problems when comparing perceptual and attentional manipulations on conscious access is that they tend to impact performance at different levels, with perceptual manipulations like masking producing larger effects. The study utilizes a staircasing procedure to find the optimal contrast of the mask stimuli to produce a performance impairment to the illusory perception comparable to the attentional condition, both in terms of perceptual performance (i.e., indicating whether the target contained the Kanizsa illusion) and metacognition (i.e., confidence in the response).

The results show a clear dissociation between the three levels of visual processing in terms of temporal dynamics. Local contrast was represented at an early stage (~80 ms), while collinearity and illusory perception were associated with later stages (~200-250 ms). Furthermore, the results provide clear evidence in support of a dissociation between the effects of perceptual and attentional processes on conscious access: while the former affected both neuronal correlates of collinearity and illusory perception, the latter did not have any effect on the processing of the more complex visual features involved in the illusion perception.

Weaknesses:

The design of the study and the results presented are very similar to those in Fahrenfort et al. (2017), reducing its novelty. Similar to the current study, Fahrenfort et al. (2017) tested the idea that if both masking and AB impact perceptual integration, they should affect the neural markers of perceptual integration in a similar way. They found that behavioural performance (hit/false alarm rate) was affected by both masking and AB, even though only the latter was significant in the unmasked condition. An early classification peak was instead only affected by masking. However, a late classification peak showed a pattern similar to the behavioural results, with classification affected by both masking and AB.

The interpretation of the results mainly centres on the theoretical framework of the recurrent processing theory of consciousness (Lamme, 2020), which lead to the assumption that local contrast, collinearity, and the illusory perception reflect feedforward, local recurrent, and global recurrent connections, respectively. It should be mentioned, however, that this theoretical prediction is not directly tested in the study. Moreover, the evidence for the dissociation between illusion and collinearity in terms of lateral and feedback connections seems at least limited. For instance, Kok et al. (2016) found that, whereas bottom-up stimulation activated all cortical layers, feedback activity induced by illusory figures led to a selective activation of the deep layers. Lee & Nguyen (2001), instead, found that V1 neurons respond to illusory contours of the Kanizsa figures, particularly in the superficial layers. They all mention feedback connections, but none seem to point to lateral connections.

Moreover, the evidence in favour of primarily lateral connections driving collinearity seems mixed as well. On one hand, Liang et al. (2017) showed that feedback and lateral connections closely interact to mediate image grouping and segmentation. On the other hand, Stettler et al. (2002) showed that, whereas the intrinsic connections link similarly oriented domains in V1, V2 to V1 feedback displays no such specificity. Furthermore, the other studies mentioned in the manuscript did not investigate feedback connections but only lateral ones, making it difficult to draw any clear conclusions.

  1. Howard Hughes Medical Institute
  2. Wellcome Trust
  3. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
  4. Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation