Transdiagnostic compulsivity is associated with reduced reminder setting, only partially attributable to overconfidence

  1. University College London
  2. Trinity College Dublin

Peer review process

Not revised: This Reviewed Preprint includes the authors’ original preprint (without revision), an eLife assessment, and public reviews.

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Editors

  • Reviewing Editor
    Nils Kolling
    Stem-cell and Brain Institute (SBRI), U1208 Inserm, Bron Cedex, France
  • Senior Editor
    Michael Frank
    Brown University, Providence, United States of America

Reviewer #1 (Public Review):

Summary:

Boldt et al test several possible relationships between trandiagnostically-defined compulsivity and cognitive offloading in a large online sample. To do so, they develop a new and useful cognitive task to jointly estimate biases in confidence and reminder-setting. In doing so, they find that over-confidence is related to less utilization of reminder-setting, which partially mediates the negative relationship between compulsivity and lower reminder-setting. The paper thus establishes that, contrary to the over-use of checking behaviors in patients with OCD, greater levels of transdiagnostically-defined compulsivity predict less deployment of cognitive offloading. The authors offer speculative reasons as to why (perhaps it's perfectionism in less clinically-severe presentations that lowers the cost of expending memory resources), and set an agenda to understand the divergence in cognition between clinical and nonclinical samples. Because only a partial mediation had robust evidence, multiple effects may be at play, whereby compulsivity impacts cognitive offloading via overconfidence and also by other causal pathways.

Strengths:

The study develops an easy-to-implement task to jointly measure confidence and replicates several major findings on confidence and cognitive-offloading. The study uses a useful measure of cognitive offloading - the tendency to set reminders to augment accuracy in the presence of experimentally manipulated costs. Moreover, the utilizes multiple measures of presumed biases - overall tendency to set reminders, the empirically estimated indifference point at which people engage reminders, and a bias measure that compares optimal indifference points to engage reminders relative to the empirically-observed indifference points. That the study observes convergenence along all these measures strengthens the inferences made relating compulsivity to the under-use of reminder-setting. Lastly, the study does find evidence for one of several a priori hypotheses and sets a compelling agenda to try to explain why such a finding diverges from an ostensible opposing finding in clinical OCD samples and the over-use of cognitive offloading.

Weaknesses:

Although I think this design and study are very helpful for the field, I felt that a feature of the design might reduce the tasks's sensitivity to measuring dispositional tendencies to engage cognitive offloading. In particular, the design introduces prediction errors, that could induce learning and interfere with natural tendencies to deploy reminder-setting behavior. These PEs comprise whether a given selected strategy will be or not be allowed to be engaged. We know individuals with compulsivity can learn even when instructed not to learn (e.g., Sharp, Dolan, and Eldar, 2021, Psychological Medicine), and that more generally, they have trouble with structure knowledge (eg Seow et al; Fradkin et al), and thus might be sensitive to these PEs. Thus, a dispositional tendency to set reminders might be differentially impacted for those with compulsivity after an NPE, where they want to set a reminder, but aren't allowed to. After such an NPE, they may avoid more so the tendency to set reminders. Those with compulsivity likely have superstitious beliefs about how checking behaviors leads to a resolution of catastrophes, which might in part originate from inferring structure in the presence of noise or from purely irrelevant sources of information for a given decision problem.

It would be good to know if such learning effects exist if they're modulated by PE (you can imagine PEs are higher if you are more incentivized - e.g., 9 points as opposed to only 3 points - to use reminders, and you are told you cannot use them), and if this learning effect confounds the relationship between compulsivity and reminder-setting.

A more subtle point, I think this study can be more said to be an exploration than a deductive test of a particular model -> hypothesis -> experiment. Typically, when we test a hypothesis, we contrast it with competing models. Here, the tests were two-sided because multiple models, with mutually exclusive predictions (over-use or under-use of reminders) were tested. Moreover, it's unclear exactly how to make sense of what is called the direct mechanism, which is supported by partial (as opposed to complete) mediation.

Reviewer #2 (Public Review):

Summary:

Boldt et al. investigated whether previously established relationships between transdiagnostic psychiatric symptom dimensions and confidence distortions would result in downstream influences on the confidence-related behaviour of reminder setting. 600 individuals from the general population completed a battery of psychiatric symptom questionnaires and an online reminder-setting task. In line with previous studies, individuals high in compulsivity (CIT) showed over-confidence in their task performance, whereas individuals high in anxious depression (AD) tended to be under-confident. Crucially, the over-confidence associated with CIT partially mediated a decreased tendency to use external reminders during task performance, whereas the under-confidence associated with AD did not result in any alteration in the external reminder setting. The authors suggest that metacognitive monitoring is impaired in CIT which has a knock-on effect on reminder setting behaviour, but that a direct link also exists between CIT and reduced reminder setting independently of confidence.

Strengths:

The study combines the latest advances in transdiagnostic approaches to psychopathology with a cleverly designed external reminder-setting task. The approach allows for investigation of what some of the downstream consequences associated with impaired metacognition in sub-clinical psychopathology may be.

The experimental design and hypotheses were pre-registered prior to data collection.

The manuscript is well written and rigorous analysis approaches are used throughout.

Weaknesses:

Participants only performed a single task so it remains unclear if the observed effects would generalise to reminder-setting in other cognitive domains.

The sample consisted of participants recruited from the general population. Future studies should investigate whether the effects observed extend to individuals with the highest levels of symptoms (including clinical samples).

  1. Howard Hughes Medical Institute
  2. Wellcome Trust
  3. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
  4. Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation