Peer review process
Revised: This Reviewed Preprint has been revised by the authors in response to the previous round of peer review; the eLife assessment and the public reviews have been updated where necessary by the editors and peer reviewers.
Read more about eLife’s peer review process.Editors
- Reviewing EditorNils KollingStem-cell and Brain Institute (SBRI), U1208 Inserm, Bron Cedex, France
- Senior EditorMichael FrankBrown University, Providence, United States of America
Reviewer #1 (Public review):
Summary:
Boldt et al test several possible relationships between trandiagnostically-defined compulsivity and cognitive offloading in a large online sample. To do so, they develop a new and useful cognitive task to jointly estimate biases in confidence and reminder-setting. In doing so, they find that over-confidence is related to less utilization of reminder-setting, which partially mediates the negative relationship between compulsivity and lower reminder-setting. The paper thus establishes that, contrary to the over-use of checking behaviors in patients with OCD, greater levels of transdiagnostically-defined compulsivity predicts less deployment of cognitive offloading. The authors offer speculative reasons as to why (perhaps it's perfectionism in less clinically-severe presentations that lowers the cost of expending memory resources), and sets an agenda to understand the divergence in cognitive between clinical and nonclinical samples. Because only a partial mediation had robust evidence, multiple effects may be at play, whereby compulsivity impacts cognitive offloading via overconfidence and also by other causal pathways.
Strengths:
The study develops an easy-to-implement task to jointly measure confidence and replicates several major findings on confidence and cognitive offloading. The study uses a useful measure of cognitive offloading - the tendency to set reminders to augment accuracy in the presence of experimentally manipulated costs. Moreover, the utilizes multiple measures of presumed biases -- overall tendency to set reminders, the empirically estimated indifference point at which people engage reminders, and a bias measure that compares optimal indifference points to engage reminders relative to the empirically observed indifference points. That the study observes convergenence along all these measures strengthens the inferences made relating compulsivity to the under-use of reminder-setting. Lastly, the study does find evidence for one of several a priori hypotheses and sets a compelling agenda to try to explain why such a finding diverges from an ostensible opposing finding in clinical OCD samples and the over-use of cognitive offloading.
Weaknesses:
Although I think this design and study are very helpful for the field, I felt that a feature of the design might reduce the tasks's sensitivity to measuring dispositional tendencies to engage cognitive offloading. In particular, the design introduces prediction errors, that could induce learning and interfere with natural tendencies to deploy reminder-setting behavior. These PEs comprise whether a given selected strategy will be or not be allowed to be engaged. We know individuals with compulsivity can learn even when instructed not to learn (e.g., Sharp, Dolan and Eldar, 2021, Psychological Medicine), and that more generally, they have trouble with structure knowledge (eg Seow et al; Fradkin et al), and thus might be sensitive to these PEs. Thus, a dispositional tendency to set reminders might be differentially impacted for those with compulsivity after an NPE, where they want to set a reminder, but aren't allowed to. After such an NPE, they may avoid moreso the tendency to set reminders. Those with compulsivity likely have superstitious beliefs about how checking behaviors lead to a resolution of catastrophes, that might in part originate from inferring structure in the presence of noise or from purely irrelevant sources of information for a given decision problem.
It would be good to know if such learning effects exist, if they're modulated by PE (you can imagine PEs are higher if you are more incentivized - e.g., 9 points as opposed to only 3 points - to use reminders, and you are told you cannot use them), and if this learning effect confounds the relationship between compulsivity and reminder-setting.
A more subtle point, I think this study can be more said to be an exploration than a deductive of test of a particular model -> hypothesis -> experiment. Typically, when we test a hypothesis, we contrast it with competing models. Here, the tests were two-sided because multiple models, with mutually exclusive predictions (over-use or under-use of reminders) were tested. Moreover, it's unclear exactly how to make sense of what is called the direct mechanism, which is supported by the partial (as opposed to complete) mediation.
Comments on revisions:
I have the following final comments for your manuscript revisions:
To improve the clarity of the work, I suggest a final note to the authors to say more explicitly that objective accuracy has a finer resolution *due to the number of "special circles" per trial* in their task. This task detail got lost in my read of the manuscript, and confused me with respect to the resolution of each accuracy measure. Similarly for clarification, they could point out that their exclusion criteria removes subjects that have lower OIP than their AIP analysis allows (which is good for comparison between OIP and AIP). Thus, it removes the possibility that very poor performing subjects (OIP) are forced to have a higher than actual AIP due to the range).