The dominant models of learning and memory, such as Hebbian plasticity, propose that experiences are transformed into memories through input-specific synaptic plasticity at the time of learning. However, synaptic plasticity is neither strictly input-specific nor restricted to the time of its induction. The impact of such forms of non-Hebbian plasticity on memory has been difficult to test, and hence poorly understood. Here, we demonstrate that synaptic manipulations can deviate from the Hebbian model of learning, yet produce a lasting memory. First, we established a weak associative conditioning protocol in mice, where optogenetic stimulation of sensory thalamic input to the amygdala was paired with a footshock, but no detectable memory was formed. However, when the same input was potentiated minutes before or after, or even 24 hr later, the associative experience was converted into a lasting memory. Importantly, potentiating an independent input to the amygdala minutes but not 24 hr after the pairing produced a lasting memory. Thus, our findings suggest that the process of transformation of a transient experience into a memory is neither restricted to the time of the experience nor to the synapses triggered by it; instead, it can be influenced by past and future events.

How is the information-processing architecture of the human brain organised, and how does its organisation support consciousness? Here, we combine network science and a rigorous information-theoretic notion of synergy to delineate a ‘synergistic global workspace’, comprising gateway regions that gather synergistic information from specialised modules across the human brain. This information is then integrated within the workspace and widely distributed via broadcaster regions. Through functional MRI analysis, we show that gateway regions of the synergistic workspace correspond to the human brain’s default mode network, whereas broadcasters coincide with the executive control network. We find that loss of consciousness due to general anaesthesia or disorders of consciousness corresponds to diminished ability of the synergistic workspace to integrate information, which is restored upon recovery. Thus, loss of consciousness coincides with a breakdown of information integration within the synergistic workspace of the human brain. This work contributes to conceptual and empirical reconciliation between two prominent scientific theories of consciousness, the Global Neuronal Workspace and Integrated Information Theory, while also advancing our understanding of how the human brain supports consciousness through the synergistic integration of information.