Evolution of empathetic moral evaluation
- University of Pennsylvania, United States
- University of Houston, United States
Figures
Figure 1
Empathetic and egocentric modes of moral assessment.
An observer updates the reputation of a donor based on the donor’s action towards a recipient and the recipient’s reputation. (a) An egocentric observer () forms a moral judgment based on the …
Figure 2 with 1 supplement
Empathetic moral evaluation facilitates the evolution of cooperation.
We analyzed strategy evolution in the donation game under different social norms of moral assessment. Triangles describe the frequencies of three alternative strategies: unconditional defectors …
Figure 2—figure supplement 1
Cooperation rates at the cooperative equilibria of strategy evolution.
For Stern Judging (SJ) and Shunning (SH) norms the cooperative equilibrium (when it exists) corresponds to a homogeneous population of DISC players, while for Simple Standing (SS) and Scoring (SC) …
Figure 3 with 1 supplement
Empathetic moral judgment facilitates cooperation.
The degree of empathy, , determines which social norms of moral assessment produce the most cooperation and thus the greatest social benefit. (a) The Stern Judging (SJ) norm supports the highest …
Figure 3—figure supplement 1
Mean cooperation rates with continuous strategies.
The figure shows results of Monte Carlo simulations assuming a continuous strategy space , with mutations sampled uniformly. The qualitative results agree with those reported in Figure 3 for …
Figure 4
Evolution of empathy.
The figure summarizes analytical predictions for empathy evolution under three different social norms, using adaptive dynamics in a population of discriminators, compared to Monte Carlo simulations …
Figure 5 with 1 supplement
Evolutionary stability of empathy.
Circles indicate evolutionarily stable (solid) and unstable (open) singular values of empathy, , in an infinite population of discriminator strategists. (a) Above a critical benefit-cost ratio , …
Figure 5—figure supplement 1
Empathy-strategy co-evolution in an infinite population under Simple Standing norm.
The figure combines the equilibria analysis in the replicator dynamics for strategy evolution given fixed empathy, ; and singular-point analysis in pairwise invasibility plots for empathy …
Additional files
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Transparent reporting form
- https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.44269.011
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Source data 1
Zip folder with data for all figures, code to produce the figures from these data, and the simulation code that generated the data.
- https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.44269.012
