Task and Model Space. (A) Participants were invited to play a three-phase, repeated social value orientation paradigm—the Intentions Game—with virtual partners. Phase 1 of the Intentions Game lasted 36 trials and asks participants to make a forced choice between two options as to how to split points with an anonymous virtual partner. An example of a prosocial-individualistic pair of options could be (self=5, other=5) or (self=10, other=5) - if the participant chooses option 1 they could be viewed as less individualistic and more prosocial as the outcomes to the other do not change, but the self would earn less. In phase 2, lasting 54 trials, participants were asked to predict the decisions of a new anonymous partner using the same two-forced choice set-up and the same option pairs; participants were given feedback on whether they were correct or incorrect in their prediction. We used Amazon Web Services to create a novel server architecture to match participants and (virtual) partners (Burgess et al., 2023 ). Partners in phase 2 were matched to be approximately 50% different from the participant with respect to their choices in phase 1 to ensure all participants needed to learn about their phase 2 partner, and to provide a mechanism to examine whether beliefs about partners had an effect on the self. Phase 3 was identical to phase 1, although participants were informed that they were matched with a third anonymous partner, unconnected to the partners in phase 1 and 2. At the end of the game, if participants collected over 1000 points overall, they were entered into a lottery to win a bonus. (B) We created four models that may explain the data and to test theories of social generalization. Model M1 assumes participants are subject to both self-insertion and social-contagion, that is, participants used their own preferences as a prior about their partner in phase 2, and partner behaviour subsequently influenced participant’s preferences in phase 3. Model M4 assumes participants are subject to neither self-insertion nor social contagion, instead forming a novel prior around the phase 2 partner rather than using their own preferences and failing to be influenced by their partner after observation. Models M2 and M3 suggest participants are only explained by either self-insertion or social-contagion, not both. (C) We assume that participants choices in phase 1 are governed by both a median and standard deviation . Participants insert their median preferences into their prior beliefs over their partner in phase 2, but with a different standard deviation to allow for flexibility and learning . The combination of the prior and posterior belief uncertainty about the partner , the precision participants have over their own preferences , and the median posterior of the participant and partner * form the new median and standard deviation over participant preferences in phase 3 . (D) In contrast to M1, M4 generates a new central tendency over the partner in phase 2 which disconnects participant preferences and prior beliefs. M4 also assumes that the same parameters that generated participant choices in phase 1 also generate choices in phase 3. (E) Simulating our model demonstrates how different combinations of α (preferences for absolute self-reward) and β (preferences for relative reward; prosocial-competitiveness) lead to changes in the discrepancy of value between participants and partners (left panel). We also show how increasing uncertainty over self-beliefs, and higher precision over partners, causally draws participants more toward the beliefs of their partner in phase 3 and increases their precision over their phase 3 beliefs (Moutoussis et al., 2016 ).