From cognition to compensation: Neurocomputational mechanisms of guilt-driven and shame-driven altruistic behavior

Reviewer #1 (Public review):

Summary:

This work provides important new evidence of the cognitive and neural mechanisms that give rise to feelings of shame and guilt, as well as their transformation into compensatory behavior. The authors use a well-designed interpersonal task to manipulate responsibility and harm, eliciting varying levels of shame and guilt in participants. The study combines behavioral, computational, and neuroimaging approaches to offer a comprehensive account of how these emotions are experienced and acted upon. Notably, the findings reveal distinct patterns in how harm and responsibility contribute to guilt and shame and how these factors are integrated into compensatory decision-making.

Strengths:

(1) Investigating both guilt and shame in a single experimental framework allows for a direct comparison of their behavioral and neural effects while minimizing confounds.

(2) The study provides a novel contribution to the literature by exploring the neural bases underlying the conversion of shame into behavior.

(3) The task is creative and ecologically valid, simulating a realistic social situation while retaining experimental control.

(4) Computational modeling and fMRI analysis yield converging evidence for a quotient-based integration of harm and responsibility in guiding compensatory behavior.

Weaknesses:

(1) Post-experimental self-reports rely both on memory and on the understanding of the conceptual difference between the two emotions. Additionally, it is unclear whether the 16 scenarios were presented in random order; sequential presentation could have introduced contrast effects or demand characteristics.

(2) In the neural analysis of emotion sensitivity, the authors identify brain regions correlated with responsibility-driven shame sensitivity and then use those brain regions as masks to test whether they were more involved in the responsibility-driven shame sensitivity than the other types of emotion sensitivity. I wonder if this is biasing the results. Would it be better to use a cross-validation approach? A similar issue might arise in "Activation analysis (neural basis of compensatory sensitivity)."

Additional comments and questions:

(1) Regarding the traits of guilt and shame, I appreciate using the scores from the subscales (evaluations and action tendencies) separately for the analyses (instead of a composite score). An issue with using the actions subscales when measuring guilt and shame proneness is that the behavioral tendencies for each emotion get conflated with their definitions, risking circularity. It is reassuring that the behavior evaluation subscale was significantly correlated with compensatory behavior (not only the action tendencies subscale). However, the absence of significant neural correlates for the behavior evaluation subscale raises questions: Do the authors have thoughts on why this might be the case, and any implications?

(2) Regarding the computational model finding that participants seem to disregard self-interest, do the authors believe it may reflect the relatively small endowment at stake? Do the authors believe this behavior would persist if the stakes were higher? Additionally, might the type of harm inflicted (e.g., electric shock vs. less stigmatized/less ethically charged harm like placing a hand in ice-cold water) influence the weight of self-interest in decision-making?

Taken together, the conclusions of the paper are well supported by the data. It would be valuable for future studies to validate these findings using alternative tasks or paradigms to ensure the robustness and generalizability of the observed behavioral and neural mechanisms.

Reviewer #2 (Public review):

Summary:

The authors combined behavioral experiments, computational modeling, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying guilt, shame, and the altruistic behaviors driven by these emotions. The results revealed that guilt is more strongly associated with harm, whereas shame is more closely linked to responsibility. Compared to shame, guilt elicited a higher level of altruistic behavior. Computational modeling demonstrated how individuals integrate information about harm and responsibility. The fMRI findings identified a set of brain regions involved in representing harm and responsibility, transforming responsibility into feelings of shame, converting guilt and shame into altruistic actions, and mediating the effect of trait guilt on compensatory behavior.

Strengths:

This study offers a significant contribution to the literature on social emotions by moving beyond prior research that typically focused on isolated aspects of guilt and shame. The study presents a comprehensive examination of these emotions, encompassing their cognitive antecedents, affective experiences, behavioral consequences, trait-level characteristics, and neural correlates. The authors have introduced a novel experimental task that enables such a systematic investigation and holds strong potential for future research applications. The computational modeling procedures were implemented in accordance with current field standards. The findings are rich and offer meaningful theoretical insights. The manuscript is well written, and the results are clearly and logically presented.

Weaknesses:

In this study, participants' feelings of guilt and shame were assessed retrospectively, after they had completed all altruistic decision-making tasks. This reliance on memory-based self-reports may introduce recall bias, potentially compromising the accuracy of the emotion measurements.

In many behavioral economic models, self-interest plays a central role in shaping individual decision-making, including moral decisions. However, the model comparison results in this study suggest that models without a self-interest component (such as Model 1.3) outperform those that incorporate it (such as Model 1.1 and Model 1.2). The authors have not provided a satisfactory explanation for this counterintuitive finding.

The phrases "individuals integrate harm and responsibility in the form of a quotient" and "harm and responsibility are integrated in the form of a quotient" appear in the Abstract and Discussion sections. However, based on the results of the computational modeling, it is more accurate to state that "harm and the number of wrongdoers are integrated in the form of a quotient." The current phrasing misleadingly suggests that participants represent information as harm divided by responsibility, which does not align with the modeling results. This potentially confusing expression should be revised for clarity and accuracy.

In the Discussion, the authors state: "Since no brain region associated with social cognition showed significant responses to harm or responsibility, it appears that the human brain encodes a unified measure integrating harm and responsibility (i.e., the quotient) rather than processing them as separate entities when both are relevant to subsequent emotional experience and decision-making." However, this interpretation overstates the implications of the null fMRI findings. The absence of significant activation in response to harm or responsibility does not necessarily imply that the brain does not represent these dimensions separately. Null results can arise from various factors, including limitations in the sensitivity of fMRI. It is possible that more fine-grained techniques, such as intracranial electrophysiological recordings, could reveal distinct neural representations of harm and responsibility. The interpretation of these null findings should be made with greater caution.

Reviewer #3 (Public review):

Summary:

Zhu et al. set out to elucidate how the moral emotions of guilt and shame emerge from specific cognitive antecedents - harm and responsibility - and how these emotions subsequently drive compensatory behavior. Consistent with their prediction derived from functionalist theories of emotion, their behavioral findings indicate that guilt is more influenced by harm, whereas shame is more influenced by responsibility. In line with previous research, their results also demonstrate that guilt has a stronger facilitating effect on compensatory behavior than shame. Furthermore, computational modeling and neuroimaging results suggest that individuals integrate harm and responsibility information into a composite representation of the individual's share of the harm caused. Brain areas such as the striatum, insula, temporoparietal junction, lateral prefrontal cortex, and cingulate cortex were implicated in distinct stages of the processing of guilt and/or shame. In general, this work makes an important contribution to the field of moral emotions. Its impact could be further enhanced by clarifying methodological details, offering a more nuanced interpretation of the findings, and discussing their potential practical implications in greater depth.

Strengths:

First, this work conceptualizes guilt and shame as processes unfolding across distinct stages (cognitive appraisal, emotional experience, and behavioral response) and investigates the psychological and neural characteristics associated with their transitions from one stage to the next.

Second, the well-designed experiment effectively manipulates harm and responsibility - two critical antecedents of guilt and shame.

Third, the findings deepen our understanding of the mechanisms underlying guilt and shame beyond what has been established in previous research.

Weaknesses:

(1) Over the course of the task, participants may gradually become aware of their high error rate in the dot estimation task. This could lead them to discount their own judgments and become inclined to rely on the choices of other deciders. It is unclear whether participants in the experiment had the opportunity to observe or inquire about others' choices. This point is important, as the compensatory decision-making process may differ depending on whether choices are made independently or influenced by external input.

(2) Given the inherent complexity of human decision-making, it is crucial to acknowledge that, although the authors compared eight candidate models, other plausible alternatives may exist. As such, caution is warranted when interpreting the computational modeling results.

(3) I do not agree with the authors' claim that "computational modeling results indicated that individuals integrate harm and responsibility in the form of a quotient" (i.e., harm/responsibility). Rather, the findings appear to suggest that individuals may form a composite representation of the harm attributable to each individual (i.e., harm/the number of people involved). The explanation of the modeling results ought to be precise.

(4) Many studies have reported positive associations between trait gratitude, social value orientation, and altruistic behavior. It would be helpful if the authors could provide an explanation about why this study failed to replicate these associations.

(5) As the authors noted, guilt and shame are closely linked to various psychiatric disorders. It would be valuable to discuss whether this study has any implications for understanding or even informing the treatment of these disorders.