A common mechanism underlies changes of mind about decisions and confidence

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Abstract

Decisions are accompanied by a degree of confidence that a selected option is correct. A sequential sampling framework explains the speed and accuracy of decisions and extends naturally to the confidence that the decision rendered is likely to be correct. However, discrepancies between confidence and accuracy suggest that confidence might be supported by mechanisms dissociated from the decision process. Here we show that this discrepancy can arise naturally because of simple processing delays. When participants were asked to report choice and confidence simultaneously, their confidence, reaction time and a perceptual decision about motion were explained by bounded evidence accumulation. However, we also observed revisions of the initial choice and/or confidence. These changes of mind were explained by a continuation of the mechanism that led to the initial choice. Our findings extend the sequential sampling framework to vacillation about confidence and invites caution in interpreting dissociations between confidence and accuracy.

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Ronald van den Berg

Computational and Biological Learning Laboratory, Department of Engineering, Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Competing interests
The authors declare that no competing interests exist.
Kavi Anandalingam

Computational and Biological Learning Laboratory, Department of Engineering, Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Competing interests
The authors declare that no competing interests exist.
Ariel Zylberberg

Kavli Institute, Department of Neuroscience, Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, United States

Competing interests
The authors declare that no competing interests exist.
Roozbeh Kiani

Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, United States

Competing interests
The authors declare that no competing interests exist.
Michael N Shadlen

Kavli Institute, Department of Neuroscience, Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, United States

Competing interests
The authors declare that no competing interests exist.
Daniel M Wolpert

Computational and Biological Learning Lab, Department of Engineering, Cambridge University, Cambridge, United Kingdom

For correspondence
wolpert@eng.cam.ac.uk

Competing interests
The authors declare that no competing interests exist.

Ethics

Human subjects: The Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee approved the experimental protocol, and subjects gave written informed consent.

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This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License permitting unrestricted use and redistribution provided that the original author and source are credited.