Midbrain dopamine neurons compute inferred and cached value prediction errors in a common framework

  1. Brian F Sadacca
  2. Joshua L Jones
  3. Geoffrey Schoenbaum  Is a corresponding author
  1. National Institutes of Health, United States

Abstract

Midbrain dopamine neurons have been proposed to signal reward prediction errors as defined in temporal difference (TD) learning algorithms. While these models have been extremely powerful in interpreting dopamine activity, they typically do not use value derived through inference in computing errors. This is important because much real world behavior - and thus many opportunities for error-driven learning - is based on such predictions. Here, we show that error-signaling rat dopamine neurons respond to the inferred, model-based value of cues that have not been paired with reward and do so in the same framework as they track the putative cached value of cues previously paired with reward. This suggests that dopamine neurons access a wider variety of information than contemplated by standard TD models and that, while their firing conforms to predictions of TD models in some cases, they may not be restricted to signaling errors from TD predictions.

Article and author information

Author details

  1. Brian F Sadacca

    Intramural Research program of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, United States
    Competing interests
    The authors declare that no competing interests exist.
  2. Joshua L Jones

    Intramural Research program of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, United States
    Competing interests
    The authors declare that no competing interests exist.
  3. Geoffrey Schoenbaum

    Intramural Research program of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, United States
    For correspondence
    geoffrey.schoenbaum@nih.gov
    Competing interests
    The authors declare that no competing interests exist.

Reviewing Editor

  1. Timothy EJ Behrens, University College London, United Kingdom

Ethics

Animal experimentation: Experiments were performed at the National Institute on Drug Abuse Intramural Research Program in accordance with NIH guidelines and an approved institutional animal care and use committee protocol (15-CNRB-108). The protocol was approved by the ACUC at NIDA-IRP (Assurance Number: A4149-01).

Version history

  1. Received: December 9, 2015
  2. Accepted: March 3, 2016
  3. Accepted Manuscript published: March 7, 2016 (version 1)
  4. Version of Record published: March 16, 2016 (version 2)

Copyright

This is an open-access article, free of all copyright, and may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose. The work is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication.

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  1. Brian F Sadacca
  2. Joshua L Jones
  3. Geoffrey Schoenbaum
(2016)
Midbrain dopamine neurons compute inferred and cached value prediction errors in a common framework
eLife 5:e13665.
https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.13665

Share this article

https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.13665

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